7 | Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning

219. By 10 March, President Bush’s position was hardening and he was very

reluctant to delay military action.

220. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush, they discussed the “seven solid votes”

for the resolution.105

221. Mr Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy,

wrote that Mr Blair had done most of the talking.106 President Bush thought President

Jacques Chirac of France was “trying to get us to the stage where we would not put

[the resolution] to a vote because we would be so worried about losing”.

222. Mr Blair had argued that if Chile and Mexico could be shifted, that would “change

the weather”. If France and Russia then vetoed the resolution but the “numbers were

right on the UN”, Mr Blair thought that he would “have a fighting chance of getting it

through the Commons”. Subsequently, Mr Blair suggested that a change in Chile and

Mexico’s position might be used to influence President Putin.

223. President Bush was “worried about rolling in more time” but Mr Blair had “held his

ground”, arguing that Chile and Mexico would “need to be able to point to something that

they won last minute that explains why they finally supported us”. President Bush “said

‘Let me be frank. The second resolution is for the benefit of Great Britain. We would

want it so we can go ahead together.’” President Bush’s position was that the US and

UK “must not retreat from 1441 and we cannot keep giving them more time”; it was “time

to do this” and there should be “no more deals”.

224. Sir David Manning sent the UK proposals for a revised deadline, and a side

statement identifying six tests on which Saddam Hussein’s intentions would be

judged, to Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, and

to President Lagos.107

225. Mr Blair wrote in his memoir that President Bush and his military were concerned

about delay.108

“It [the proposal for tests/more time] was indeed a hard sell to George. His system

was completely against it. His military were, not unreasonably, fearing that delay

gave the enemy time – and time could mean a tougher struggle and more lives lost.

This was also troubling my military. We had all sorts of contingency plans in place …

There was both UK and US intelligence warning us of the risk.

“Nonetheless I thought it was worth a try …”

105 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone Calls with Lagos, Bush

and Aznar, 10 March’.

106 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

107 Letter Manning to Rice, 10 March 2003, [untitled].

108 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

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