6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
807.
Mr Blair
responded: “This is a v. tough call”; and that he would “need to
speak to
the senior
military in detail” before he committed to Package
3.316
808.
Asked about
his comments on army morale, Sir David Manning explained,
to
the Inquiry
that he thought morale should not be a reason for participating in
a land
809.
The FCO
advised Mr Straw to question some of Mr Hoon’s
arguments.
810.
Mr Edward
Oakden, Head of FCO Security Policy Department, advised
Mr Straw
to question
whether the decision really had to be made that
week.318
•
Without a
UN resolution preparations would look like UK determination to
pursue
the
military option, “instead of backing the diplomatic route with a
credible threat
of force”
and that it would be worth drawing out the MOD’s
thinking.
•
Postponing
the decision until a UN Security Council resolution had been
agreed
seemed
“likely to make a real difference to how a move to military
preparations
would be
viewed, both domestically and internationally”.
•
Third
countries, including Turkey, would be unwilling to support
preparation or
participation
until a legal basis was found.
•
Once the
forces were deployed, there would be no going back until
Saddam
Hussein was
disarmed: “Pulling out without achieving this would cause
severe
strains
with the US and serious harm to UK credibility. So the prospect is
for a
longish
haul, with the UN inspectors likely to take some time to find what
will be
well‑concealed
WMD. We should look very hard before our first public
leap.”
•
“Many
senior Turks still [believed that] the UK” had “a secret agenda to
create
a Kurdish
homeland in Northern Iraq”; and memories of the UK’s efforts
to
dismember
Turkey in the 1920s remained “surprisingly vivid”. The UK
should
let the
US conduct negotiations with Turkey.
•
The MOD’s
suggestion that the UK could trade a more active role in
fighting
for “a
smaller military role during reconstruction” seemed “optimistic”:
“On the
contrary,
if we have fought without international legal sanction, we could be
left
on our own
with the US.”
812.
Mr Oakden
concluded that the MOD had rightly highlighted real concern
about
longer‑term
damage to the US/UK relationship “if for the first time in recent
memory the
UK decides
not to join the US on the ground”, or if it complicated US military
planning
and put US
timelines at risk. But he questioned whether that concern was at
the military,
316
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute
Manning to Blair, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
317
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, page 99.
318
Minute
Oakden to Private Secretary [FCO], 16 October 2002,
‘Iraq’.
299