10.2 | Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

408. The authors identified a number of “longer-term challenges” including:

• “We may not be able to deliver, by next year, the minimum standards

required in rule of law and governance.” The UK should consider whether

its aspiration to draw down troops by the middle of 2006 would be premature,

and how its response to a more challenging security environment might deter

organisations such as the UN and World Bank from establishing a presence in

the South.

• “We will need to allocate more resources, which might include military

resources, to security.”

409. Over the weekend of 1 and 2 October, Mr Blair considered separate pieces of

advice from Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr Powell on the implications of the Red Team

report, the FCO/MOD/DFID paper on the implications of the Jameat incident, and a

28 September JIC Assessment.236

410. Mr Blair set out his conclusions in a Note to No.10 staff on 2 October:

“I don’t think the Red Team report is advocating a different strategy; just a means of

implementing the existing one …

“The ‘ink spot’ strategy is right. It isn’t what we have done so far. What we’ve done is

take a city, give it back to the Iraqis and hope. The ‘ink spot’ strategy is to take it and

then only when the Iraqi civilian capability of governance is properly established with

the necessary military back-up, do we withdraw.” 237

411. Sir Nigel Sheinwald wrote to Mr Straw’s Principal Private Secretary on 4 October,

in response to the 30 September FCO/MOD/DFID paper on the implications of the

Jameat incident.238 Copies of the letter were sent to Cabinet Office, MOD, DFID, FCO,

Home Office and Treasury officials.

412. Sir Nigel wrote:

“The Prime Minister agrees that we do not need to change our overall strategy.

He is convinced, however, that we need a major and sustained push over the next

few months on the political and security lines of operation if we are to get what

we need – the political process moving ahead on time and producing an effective

and moderate Iraqi Government after the elections, with visible progress on the

Iraqiisation of security.”

236 Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq Update’.

237 Note Blair, 2 October 2005, [untitled].

238 Letter Sheinwald to Hayes, 4 October 2005, ‘Iraq Strategy’.

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