11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
for the
de‑Ba’athification Commission to be dissolved”. The IPU observed
that this belief
was
mistaken, since dissolution of the Commission was a decision for
the National
Assembly.
207.
Mr Patey
told the FCO that he had lobbied President Jalal Talabani
and
Mr Abdul
Aziz al‑Hakim, leader of the UIA/SCIRI, for the removal of
reference to the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission.170
208.
Mr Patey
also suggested to Prime Minister Ja’afari and Mr Masoud
Barzani, leader
of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party, that “If mention of the
de‑Ba’athification Commission
could not
be removed perhaps there could be some reference to indicate that
the
process
would be a judicial one”.171
209.
Secretary Rice
told Mr Straw on 24 August that reference to the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission
appeared to have been “dropped”.172
210.
On 28 August,
Mr Patey reported to the FCO on the substance of the
new
Constitution
which had been presented to the National Assembly.173
He
commented:
“The
spectre of de‑Ba’athification continues to haunt the text although
such
references
were heavily diluted in efforts to meet Sunni concerns
…”
211.
Mr Patey
observed that the preamble to the Constitution made an
important
distinction
between “the dictator’s regime and the mainstream Ba’ath Party”
and
recognised
that Sunnis had suffered with other Iraqis under Saddam. But
extremist
groups,
which included “Saddamists” were prohibited.
212.
Sir William
Patey told the Inquiry:
“We spent a
lot of time … trying to convince the transitional government and
the
Shia
politicians that de‑Ba’athification had gone too far, that the
de‑Ba’athification
commission
was being abused. It was being used as a tool to further political
ends
rather than
save Iraq from a return of the Ba’ath. Now, that is not an argument
that
was
accepted very readily by Shia, who had a visceral fear of the
Ba’athists and
saw
Ba’athists in most places. So we had limited success. We were
arguing for the
de‑Ba’athification
provisions to be excluded from the Constitution. We
managed
to get
them watered down, we managed to get them
reviewed.”174
170
eGram
11744/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution: Getting Sunni Arab
Buy‑In’.
171
eGram
11834/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution: Some Prospect of
Changes to
Draft to Accommodate Key Sunni Arab Concerns’.
172
Minute
Siddiq to Sawers, 24 August 2005, ‘The Foreign Secretary’s
conversation with the US Secretary
of State,
24 August’.
173
eGram
12004/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 28 August 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution: Worth Waiting For’.
174
Public
hearing, 5 January 2010, pages 6‑7.
41