The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
370.
Ten days
later, Mr Benn, who had received a copy of Dr Reid’s
letter, expressed his
support for
the proposal, pointing out that it would also “significantly reduce
the current
threat
against UK forces and DFID staff”.259
371.
The FCO SOSA
visited Kirkuk, Baghdad and Basra between 10 and
21
November.260
He reported
that:
“The number
of terrorist attacks remains at a high level and continues to be
well
targeted
and professional. The main threat to our staff in Baghdad and Basra
is
from
Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs). However, all methods of
Vehicle Borne
Improvised
Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) can be expected in all areas in which
our
staff
operate. Indirect fire attacks are a threat to all our bases and
the threat [of]
kidnap is
high.
“The
Security Managers and CRG are to be congratulated on their
professional
control of
road movement … It is clear that all road moves are subject to
risk.
The
completion of accommodation at the police academies and at the
airports in
Baghdad and
Basra will allow more flexibility. The use of helicopters is vital
in order
to change
the pattern of movements.
“We
recommend that all staff in Basra can move in Warrior armoured
vehicles.”
372.
Growing
pressure on military assets created tension between civilian
and
military
personnel.
373.
Assistant
Chief Constable (ACC) Colin Smith, the UK’s Chief Police Adviser
in
Iraq from
May 2005 to April 2006, told the Inquiry that, when the FCO handed
over
responsibility
for operational delivery of Security Sector Reform to the MOD in
October
2005 (see
Section 12.1), one UK General Officer Commanding (GOC) in
MND(SE)
“indicated
that unless civilian contractors agreed to be carried in ‘Snatch’
Land Rovers
their
contracts should be terminated”.261
374.
Chief
Constable (CC) Paul Kernaghan, holder of the International Affairs
portfolio
for the
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) from 2001 to 2008, told
the Inquiry
that duty
of care for civilians in Iraq, including police, was addressed on a
collective
basis in
Whitehall and that he only had to intervene twice: to allow police
training officers
to remain
overnight at their training centre; and to prohibit police officers
from being
transported
in UK military Snatch Land Rovers.262
He insisted
that they be transported
in better
protected vehicles, including Warrior:
“I know
this meant police officers were treated differently from soldiers,
but police
officers
are not soldiers and different considerations apply.”
259
Letter Benn
to Browne, 10 November 2005, [untitled].
260
Minute SMD
[junior official] to Patey, 1 December 2005, ‘Security Visit to
Baghdad and Basra’.
261
Statement,
25 June 2010, page 7.
262
Statement,
9 June 2010, page 8.
308