3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
“The fact
that the US plan apparently ignores these conditions causes me
particular
concern.
Are they determined to go ahead regardless? Does the omission
signal a
weakening
of US commitment to work for progress in these areas before
deciding
to launch
military action? None of them is getting any easier:
•
in the
Middle East (and elsewhere) public
opinion remains
deeply hostile
to military
action. An aggressive public opinion campaign, demonstrating
–
truthfully
– that we had exhausted all other options and making the most
of
what
limited new WMD evidence we have would be needed to reduce
this.
•
on
the UN
route, the UN
Secretary-General’s dialogue with Iraq has so far
made no
concrete progress …
•
President
Bush’s speech has not improved the prospects of moving
the
Israel/Palestinian
conflict into calmer waters.
•
the
prospects for constructing a legal basis for military action are
uncertain
at best.”
“The key
point is how to get through to the Americans that the success of
any
military
operation against Iraq – and protection of our fundamental
interests in the
region –
depends on devising in advance a coherent strategy which assesses
the
political
and economic as well as military implications. They must also
understand
that we are
serious about our conditions for UK involvement.”
181.
The letter was
also sent to Mr Brown, Mr Hoon and Sir Richard Wilson.
182.
Sir
Christopher Meyer reported speculation in the US media and a number
of
recent
discussions in Washington on 9 July.80
183.
In a press
conference on 8 July, President Bush had not attempted to
challenge
the
veracity of a story about leaked military plans. Sir Christopher’s
contacts suggested
that the
aim was to have a reworked military plan on President Bush’s desk
before he
went on
holiday in August.
184.
Sir
Christopher reported that, following a meeting between the UN and
Iraq
the previous
week, Mr Annan was perceived to have little interest in further
meetings.
The US view
was that there was little point in further “technical contacts”
although
they would
wait to see what was proposed at the next meeting of the Security
Council.
Iraq “hoped
to pin the blame for the failure of the process on the US, UK and
UN by
co-operating
on the marginal issues but doing little on the core questions”.
There was
concern
about the lack of knowledge about Iraq amongst the non-P5 members
of the
Security
Council.
80
Telegram
926 Washington to FCO London, 9 July 2002, ‘Iraq: US
views’.
35