6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
since then
had been minimal. The DIS assessed that theoretical power
generation
capacity
was about 10,000 megawatts (MW), but that the “practical limit” was
about
5,000 MW,
well below “even the most basic demand”. Power cuts were
widespread
and prolonged.
The report stated that the UN had begun extensive works to
rehabilitate
the
transmission network.
110.
The DIS cited
“a recent UN report” which suggested the Iraqi oil industry
had
declined
seriously over the previous 18 months and that “urgent measures”
needed
to be
taken to avoid yet more deterioration of oil wells and petroleum
infrastructure.
Of 12
oil refineries in Iraq, only three were operating, inefficiently
and unreliably.
Pipelines
in Iraq had not been repaired since 1991 and oil distribution was
by road.
111.
On Iraq’s
water and sewerage systems, the DIS assessed that:
“...
despite recent heavy investment into modernisation and extension of
municipal
water
systems, the water supply and sanitation sectors in Iraq are in a
state of
continuous
deterioration.”
112.
The DIS
reported that, across Iraq, power outages and damage to water
pipes
meant a
substantial proportion of piped water was routinely lost and that
the water
supply was
known to be affected by sewage leaks. There were marked
differences
between
urban areas, where 96 percent of the population had access to safe,
potable
water, and
rural areas, where the figure was 48 percent. In particular, Basra
province
was
“chronically short” of drinkable water, with treatment plants
working at less than
60 percent
of capacity.
113.
The sewerage
system was in very poor condition. Sewage treatment, even
in
Baghdad,
was “virtually non-existent”, with the few treatment plants that
were functioning
operating
at less than a third of capacity. Sanitary conditions were
deteriorating because
of
indiscriminate dumping of sewage and industrial and medical
waste.
114.
The DIS warned
that, throughout Iraq, water supplies were:
“...
contaminated by pathogenic bacteria, parasites and viruses. Given
the shortages
of
essential treatment chemicals, deployed forces could not rely on
local water
supplies as
a source of safe, potable water.”
115.
A second DIS
report, in late January, stated that the Ba’ath Party, the Iraqi
civil
bureaucracy
and the armed forces were intertwined: “every government ministry
(as well
as state
labour organisations, youth and student organisations and media
organisations)
has within
it, at each level, a parallel Ba’ath Party
structure”.78
78
Paper DIS,
1 February 2002, ‘The Iraqi Ba’ath Party – its history, ideology
and role in regime security’.
133