9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

614.  Dr Marsden reported an “extremely positive” reaction to Mr Blair’s statement from

the Governor of Basra, who welcomed it at a press conference on the same day and

praised co‑operation between the MNF and the provincial government.321

615.  Dr Marsden also reported that the Chairman of Basra’s Provincial Council had not

made a public statement, but was believed to be under pressure from within the Council

to take a less positive line.

616.  When they eventually met on 27 February, the Chairman told Dr Marsden “the

Prime Minister’s statement had eased the way to end the boycott”.322

617.  In the US, the statement received “extensive coverage”.323 A report from the British

Embassy Washington characterised the debate as:

“The Administration puts on a brave face and tries to portray UK plans as evidence

of progress. The media see the announcement as a serious setback for Bush’s

surge. The Democrats use British plans as ammunition in their battle to force US

troop withdrawals.”

618.  The Embassy also observed:

“The disproportionate rejoicing in State Department at PM Howard’s decision …

is a good indicator of the fragility of the mood here.”

619.  Mr Browne told Cabinet on the morning of 22 February that, although it was early

days, Operation Fardh al‑Qanoon appeared to be working well so far.324 The main

difference between it and previous operations was the presence of US forces living in

the districts of Baghdad, providing a permanent protective presence.

620.  Mr Browne also briefed Cabinet on the situation in South‑East Iraq, which was

“relatively quiet”. He added that as a result of Op SINBAD the relationship between the

UK troops and the people of Basra had improved. There was a recognition the ISF and

the MNF must take action against militant JAM where a small minority were perpetrating

violent attacks for political and economic gain. The MNF could not deal with that

problem: only the Iraqi people could address the political and economic issues.

621.  Referring to Mr Blair’s announcement the previous day, Mr Browne said that the

reduction in troop numbers reflected military advice and that the UK’s strategy was

“the same as that of the USA”.

622.  Summing up the discussion, Mr Blair said that Gen Petraeus had a clearer idea of

the links between civilian and military activity in addressing Iraq’s problems.

321  Letter Marsden to Aldred, 23 February 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly Report’.

322  Letter Marsden to Aldred, 2 March 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly Report’.

323  eGram 7440/07 Washington to FCO London, 23 February 2007, ‘Iraq‑US: Reactions to the Prime

Minister’s Announcement’.

324  Cabinet Conclusions, 22 February 2007.

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