13.1 |
Resources
Whitehall
of the likely scale of post‑conflict activity, and the essential
nature of UN
involvement
and authority if this was to be effectively
addressed”.
266.
The meeting
also reviewed ORHA’s state of preparedness in the light of
the
Rock Drill:
•
Humanitarian
plans were the most advanced, but ORHA did not yet
have
sufficient
funds, staff or capacity to deliver them.
•
Reconstruction
plans were “not nearly as well advanced as they should
have
been at
this point”.
•
Civil
administration plans were the least advanced, and “would not be
ready
by the
six week deadline they had been set”.
267.
The meeting
concluded that ORHA’s state of preparedness was
“extremely
worrying”.
268.
The meeting
also considered financial issues. The MOD and FCO appeared
to
be more
aware of DFID’s financial constraints, but DFID had not yet
received a “clear
response to
the issue of the limitation of DFID’s engagement imposed on it by
our
financial
situation”. Ms Short told the meeting that Mr Brown “had
indicated to her, in
a private
conversation, that he ‘would do what he could to
help’”.
269.
Dr Brewer
wrote to Mr Bowen on the same day to summarise Ms Short’s
position;
copies of
the letter were sent to the MOD, FCO and Treasury.161
The letter
reflected the
conclusions
of Ms Short’s meeting with DFID officials on 18 February and
Dr Brewer’s
presentation
to the Chiefs of Staff on 19 February. Dr Brewer stated
that:
“Although
[Ms Short] would be keen for DFID to support an exemplary
humanitarian
effort in
any UK‑controlled sector, our [DFID’s] role will be constrained by
the extent
of the UN
mandate and the financial resources available to us. We have a
strong
commitment
to the UN agencies, and would want to allocate significant
funding
to them
under most scenarios. Drawing heavily on our Contingency Reserve
and
existing
humanitarian aid and Iraq budget lines is unlikely to release more
than
£60‑70m for
humanitarian assistance to Iraq in 2003/04. Given our predictions
of
the
humanitarian needs, with this level of funding we would not be able
to play the
exemplary
role [in the South] the Prime Minister has asked for, and it would
be
irresponsible
of us to plan to do so.”
270.
Mr Jeremy
Heywood, Mr Blair’s Principal Private Secretary, sent
Mr Bowman
a paper
on financing Iraqi reconstruction on 24 February.162
Mr Heywood
said that
Mr Blair
wanted to share the paper, prepared by the No.10 Policy
Directorate, with the
161
Letter
Brewer to Bowen, 24 February 2003, [untitled].
162
Letter
Heywood to Bowman, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction’
attaching Paper, [undated],
‘Financing
the Reconstruction of Iraq’.
487