3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
68.
The
Observer article also
suggested that Iraq’s nuclear capabilities included
investigating
a way to launch “dirty” nuclear bombs – unsophisticated devices
which
would
nevertheless wreak havoc if used.
69.
The Cabinet
Office ‘Iraq: Options Paper’, produced on 8 March, is addressed
later in
this
Section.
70.
A first draft
of the paper for public consumption on WMD, which addressed
Iraq,
Iran, North
Korea and Libya, was sent to No.10 on 6 March. The content of the
paper
and its
eventual focus only on Iraq is addressed in Section
4.1.
71.
Sir John
Holmes, British Ambassador to France, reported French
concerns
about
possible US actions and a desire to work with the UK on a policy
of
engagement
to keep the US within the international system.
72.
France was
not necessarily opposed to military action to remove
Saddam,
but it had
identified a number of conditions which had yet to be
met.
73.
France was
also concerned that action against states such as
Afghanistan
and Iraq
would not solve the underlying problems of WMD proliferation
and
terrorism,
and might result in recruiting more terrorists.
74.
On 11
February, the British Embassy Paris reported talks between Mr
Goulty,
Mr Patey
and Mr Felix Paganon, UN Director in the Quai
d’Orsay.29
75.
Mr Paganon was
reported to have said France was convinced the US would
take
military
action against Iraq before the end of the year. The US considered
that it did not
need
additional authority for action, and:
“When it
came to decision time, the US would proceed according to their
own
criteria,
not on the basis of consultation with allies.”
76.
France wanted
to do whatever was achievable to prevent military action, “not out
of
concern for
Saddam’s survival but through fear of the consequences of military
action”,
which could
include:
•
chaos in
Iraq, where the vacuum might be filled by another Ba’ath
general;
•
division of
Iraq; and
•
increased
instability in the region.
77.
France
believed the unconditional return of weapons inspectors was the
only way
to prevent
military action. France was no longer pressing for an early
discussion of
the Goods
Review List but there was scepticism about the prospects for
toughening
29
Telegram
100 Paris to FCO London, 11 February 2002, ‘Iraq: UK/French
Talks’.
399