3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
236.
The UK and
the US eventually agreed the text of a draft resolution as
the
basis for
discussion with other members of the P5 on 25
September.
237.
The detailed
text of a draft resolution for discussion with other members of the
P5
was finally
agreed in a conference call between Mr Straw, Secretary
Powell, Dr Rice and
officials,
including Sir David Manning and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, on 25
September.74
238.
In the
conference call:
•
It was
agreed to set the timeline for the production of an Iraqi
declaration as
“prior to
the beginning of inspections and not later than 30 days of the
date
of the
resolution”.
•
Following a
discussion of Dr Blix’s reservations about interviewing Iraqi
officials
outside
Iraq and concerns that they would be used to seek asylum,
Dr Rice
stated that
conducting interviews outside Iraq was “a red line” for the
US.
•
It was
agreed that the resolution should allow Permanent Members of
the
Security
Council to request representation on the inspection teams.
Dr Rice’s
view was
that there was “no need to be sympathetic to Iraqi concerns” that
that
would be a
route for the US and UK to get intelligence for military
strikes.
•
Dr Rice
said that there was no intention to force inspections but the US
wanted
to “signal
that conditions were different”. It was “important to have things
in the
resolution
to discard later”.
•
Reflecting
UK concerns about US draft language on provisions for
No‑Fly
or No‑Drive
Zones, which Mr Straw described as looking like “an attempt
to
legitimise
NFZs” – which was “not necessary for the future and dangerous
for
the past” –
it was agreed that the draft should distinguish zones for the
purposes
of the
resolution from the existing No‑Fly Zones.
•
Reflecting
Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s concerns that there were “many things
in
the text
that looked like trip wires”, and that it would be “better to judge
Iraq by
its actions
not its words”, it was agreed that Iraq should be given a week,
not
48 hours,
to indicate that it accepted the resolution.
•
It was
agreed that it would be better to engage Russia and France “at a
political
level”
before the French and Russian Permanent Representatives to
the
UN “got
their hands on the text”. As the US and UK got close to
agreement,
senior officials
should be sent to Moscow and Paris “to begin the task of
selling
the
text”.
74
Telegram
498 FCO London to Washington, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conference
Call with
US Administration, 25 September’.
243