14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
401.
Dr Reid agreed
on 30 August that this capability should be deployed
once
402.
On 5
September, Fusilier Stephen Robert Manning and Fusilier Donal
Anthony
Meade died
as a result of injuries sustained when the vehicle in which they
were
travelling
hit an IED in az‑Zubayr.203
They were
providing top cover at the time of
the explosion.
403.
On 11
September, Major Matthew Bacon was killed when a roadside IED hit
the
Snatch
vehicle in which he was travelling in Basra.204
Three other
British soldiers, who
were
travelling in the same vehicle, were seriously
injured.
404.
AM Torpy
visited Iraq from 12 to 15 September.205
On the threat
in MND(SE)
he reported:
“The recent
spate of IED attacks in Basra appears to be employing the same
EFP/
PIR
technology seen in Maysan … Focused intelligence effort is being
targeted
against key
individuals in these groups … with the aim of conducting
offensive
operations
at the earliest appropriate moment … On the defensive side, it
is
apparent
that aviation top cover has a positive deterrent effect and we are
looking
to see what
can be done to increase the hours available from the aircraft
currently
in theatre.
On the ground a great deal of work is under way to refine TTPs
and
the first
tranche of PIR countermeasures equipment is due to arrive in
theatre
soon.
The GOC has also worked hard … to improve the use of ISTAR
assets and
coordination
of intelligence.”
405.
The first two
M* units arrived in Iraq on 2 October.206
406.
It is clear
that UK forces struggled to cope with the sophistication of the IED
threat
in MND(SE)
during the summer of 2005.
407.
Lt Gen Riley
told the Inquiry that, after “a long spell of quiet” after he
arrived as
GOC MND(SE)
in December 2004, there was “an increase in effective attacks”
from
“the end of
April/early May” 2005.207
Those
attacks introduced more sophisticated IEDs
that “were
very hard for our countermeasures to defeat and which were capable
of
penetrating
pretty much any vehicle that had been out”.
408.
Asked how the
UK dealt with the change in threat during his time as
GOC,
Lt Gen Riley
told the Inquiry that it took “perhaps half a step backwards at
first” and that
202
Minute
APS/SofS to DJC, 30 August 2005, ‘Iraq: Pre‑detonation of Passive
Infra Red Initiated Roadside
Bombs’.
203
GOV.UK,
5 September
2005, Deaths of
two British soldiers in Iraq – Fusilier Donal Anthony Meade
and
Fusilier
Stephen Robert Manning.
204
GOV.UK,
11
September 2005, British
Officer killed in Iraq – Major Matthew Bacon.
205
Minute
Torpy to Walker, 19 September 2005, ‘CJO Visit Report – Iraq – 12
to 15 Sep 05’.
206
Report, 3
October 2005, ‘PJHQ Middle East Operations Team OPSUM 197 as at
021700Z OCT 05’.
207
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, pages 5 and 27.
69