The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
654.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw met early on 2 February.359
Sir Andrew
Turnbull (Cabinet
Secretary),
Sir David Omand, Mr Scarlett, Sir Richard Dearlove, Dr David
Pepper
(Director,
GCHQ), Mr Ehrman, Mr Powell, Sir Nigel Sheinwald,
Baroness Morgan
(No.10
Director of Political and Government Relations), and other
officials from No.10
were
present.
655.
The meeting
concluded that the Government would set up a committee to
review
the
intelligence on WMD, and agreed its Terms of Reference and
membership.
It “should
be wider than the ISC”; and it “should look at intelligence on WMD
in general,
not just
Iraq”.
656.
In their video
conference on 2 February, Mr Blair and President Bush
discussed
their
intentions to establish commissions to examine aspects of the
pre-conflict
intelligence
on Iraq and WMD.360
They also
discussed the timescale for the ISG to
produce its
final report and whether, in the meantime, further material from
the ISG’s
Interim
Report could be used in public.
657.
In
Mr Blair’s view, the ISG had already found weapons programmes,
plans to
restart
programmes after the UNMOVIC inspectors left and hitherto
undiscovered
breaches of
UN resolutions. The public and media had not digested the
implications
of the
reports and Dr Kay’s remarks. There was enough in the ISG’s
findings to justify
US/UK
military action. When the findings were linked to the wider
picture, it would
have been
irresponsible not to take action on Iraq.
658.
Following the
discussion, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent draft Terms of Reference
for
the UK
committee to Dr Rice, stating that they had been revised in the
light of the video
conference,
but were “very much a working draft”.361
659.
In a
subsequent letter, Sir Nigel wrote that he had made clear that the
UK
Terms of
Reference, which Dr Rice had not yet seen, were narrower that
those
under consideration
in the White House, and the aim was to complete the
review
“as soon
as possible”.362
660.
On
2 February, Mr Scarlett sent Mr Powell suggested
amendments to Mr Blair’s
Note to
President Bush on WMD.363
They were
“Points of detail but some are important
to get
right”.
359
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 2 February 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
on Review of Intelligence
on WMD’.
360
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 2 February 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: Prime Minister’s
Video-conference with
President
Bush, 2 February’.
361
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 2 February 2004, ‘WMD: UK
Committee’.
362
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 2 February 2004, ‘Iraq and WMD:
Conversation with US National Security
Adviser’.
363
Manuscript
comment Scarlett, 2 February 2004 on Paper [unattributed],
[undated], ‘Note on WMD’.
554