Previous page | Contents | Next page
15.1 | Civilian personnel
Seniority
611.  Ministers and officials frequently expressed concern about the difficulties faced by
the UK in deploying the right people to positions where they would be able to exert UK
influence in a US‑dominated environment and achieve lasting impact in Iraq.
612.  The issue arose in a number of different contexts. It appears not to have been
addressed systematically.
613.  The appointment of Major General Tim Cross as the senior UK member of ORHA
in February 2003 is addressed earlier in this Section.
614.  Section 9.2 describes the appointment of his successor, Mr Andy Bearpark.
615.  In the Annotated Agenda for the AHMGIR on 22 May 2003, officials advised that
Mr Bearpark needed to be given the right job to “maximise UK influence in ORHA”.399
616.  Mr Bearpark was subsequently appointed CPA Director of Operations and
Infrastructure. He arrived in Baghdad on 16 June.
617.  Section 9.2 describes how, although UK officials in Whitehall regarded Mr Bearpark
as the UK’s senior representative in the CPA, Mr Bearpark saw his primary loyalty as
lying with the CPA and Ambassador Bremer.
618.  Several weeks after Mr Bearpark’s arrival in Baghdad, the Government agreed that
a senior UK figure should be appointed to head CPA(South).
619.  On 10 July, the AHMGIR agreed that:
Secondments to the CPA should be maintained at “approximately the current
level”, but matched more closely to requirements, with more specialist than
policy staff.
The UK effort in CPA(South) should be increased “as required”, including through
the appointment of a “suitably strong UK figure” to replace Ambassador Olsen.400
620.  On 11 July 2003, Ms Hewitt advised Mr Blair of the need “to ensure that we are
seconding sufficiently senior people to the CPA”. It was noticeable that the US was
sending more senior people than the UK.401
621.  Shortly afterwards, the IPU put forward recommendations for CPA staffing
based on the principle that the UK should seek to exert influence at “all levels”.
These included:
filling gaps, including at a senior level, in UK coverage of SSR, the economic
ministries and the oil ministry;
399 Annotated Agenda, 22 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
400  Minutes, 10 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
401  Letter Hewitt to Prime Minister, 11 July 2003, ‘Report of My Visit to Baghdad’.
351
Previous page | Contents | Next page