3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
is that the
Council should say this together and formally, confront Baghdad
with
the stark
implications, and trust … the response will be complete disarmament
which
we demanded
… in SCR 687 [1991] …”
718.
Mr Sergei
Lavrov, Russian Permanent Representative to the UN, asked Sir
Jeremy
for the
“additional facts justifying” his reference to Iraq’s support for
terrorism. Sir Jeremy
reported
that Mr Lavrov also stated that the “allegations being
levelled against Iraq”
addressed
the process of disarmament, not the substance.211
719.
In subsequent
remarks to the press, Sir Jeremy stated that resolution 1441
“had
set out the
terms. Iraq had failed to co-operate. The draft resolution was
about taking
the hard
decisions that followed.”212
720.
Asked by the
Inquiry why the UK had tabled that draft resolution when,
unlike
UNSCOM in
December 1998, Dr Blix had stated he was getting co-operation
on
process,
Mr Blair replied:
“Whether he
thought the action was justified or not, his reports were
clear
that the
compliance was not immediate and the co-operation
unconditional.
721.
Mr Blair
added that he did not believe that “if Dr Blix had another six
months,
it would
have come out any differently”. Saddam Hussein “was definitely in
material
breach” of
resolution 1441; Mr Blair “had to decide” whether his (Saddam
Hussein’s)
behaviour
“really” indicated that he was “someone who had had a change of
heart”.
722.
Asked if there
was a risk in tabling the resolution that it would appear that
the
UK was
trying to curtail the process because of the demands of military
planning,
Mr Blair replied:
“It was
more, actually … the other way round … what we were trying to do
was to
say: how do
you resolve what, on any basis, is a somewhat indistinct picture
being
painted by
Dr Blix …
“… I think
we [Mr Blair and Dr Blix] … had a long conversation on
the phone.
I remember
Jack Straw was very much involved in this. Jeremy Greenstock,
I think,
at the UN,
was very much involved in this. We tried to construct these tests,
and the
most
important one, to me, was this ability to get the scientists out of
the country.”214
211
Telegram
301 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Tabling
of US/UK/Spanish
Draft
Resolution: Draft Resolution’.
212
Telegram
301 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Tabling
of US/UK/Spanish
Draft
Resolution: Draft Resolution’.
213
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 113-114.
214
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 116.
307