The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
was
“preparation to allow the commencement of offensive action in
January (with
contingency
planning for an earlier start should that prove
necessary)”.
777.
Mr Johnson
stated that the northern option was:
“… now seen
as fundamental by US military planners, both in the Pentagon and
in
CENTCOM.
There is an important role for the UK to play if we so wish. But if
we
decide not
to play this role, the US will have to mobilise other US forces …
The
caveats we
have so far attached to Package 3 have thus resulted in the US
having
to work on
two separate plans, compounding what is already a complex
process
… CENTCOM …
need a clear statement of the UK commitment, within the
overall
understanding
that all the packages are subject to a general political
caveat.”
778.
Mr Johnson
advised that the need for the UK to clarify its position “will
become
increasingly
acute”; and that:
“From a
purely national perspective, the lead‑times for putting Package 2
and
Package 3
in place mean that some publicly visible decisions … need to be
taken
well in
advance of any deployment … But we do need to be prepared to
take
these decisions.”
779.
Gen Franks
had told the UK that he would continue to run two plans “to
preserve
the
possibility of incorporating Package 3”. But the longer the US
worked on that basis
“the more
disgruntled they will be if we subsequently rule Package 3
out”.
780.
Mr Hoon
was given details of the decisions needed on both Packages 2 and
3
and their
costs. Package 2, which included a Commando Group based in HMS
Ocean,
would cost
some £464m‑500m, excluding movement costs, ammunition and
other
consumables,
and post‑operational recuperation. On the same basis, Package 3
was
estimated
to cost an additional £508m.
781.
Mr Johnson
advised Mr Hoon that, in coming to a decision, Ministers would
“need
to take
into account”:
•
The impact
of visible decisions. In addition to their role in ensuring the
viability
of a UK
contribution: “Overt preparations on the scale of Package 3 may
make
an impact
on Saddam’s perception of the seriousness of Coalition intent
…
They might
also encourage key figures in the Iraqi regime to reflect further
on
whether
their best interests continue to be served by Saddam’s leadership
…
these
measures would reinforce the coercive ‘force on mind’ approach that
has
already
borne fruit”.
•
Cost. The
costs of either package would be significant – Package 2 “could
be
not far
short of £1bn”; Packages 2 and 3 together “could be between
£1.5bn
and £2bn”.
•
US
expectations. The MOD had been “careful to manage” US
expectations
but a
decision to rule out Package 3 would “inevitably disappoint” the
US,
292