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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“This was not an easy sell. The US context … was completely opposite to ours; and
the UN did not play well there. The meeting was a little tense … In the end, one to
one, I got his acceptance … because … ultimately he bought the idea that this was
going to be a whole lot easier if we had a coalition behind us.”174
573.  In the context of putting Iraq back into the UN system, Mr Blair told the Inquiry, that
he had had “to persuade [President Bush] to take a view radically different from any of
the people in his Administration”.175
574.  Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that it would in his view have been
impossible for the UK to act in support of the US without “the UN route”, but
US acquiescence was reluctant.
575.  Asked what thought had been given to the position if President Bush had decided
not to take the UN route, Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that his assumption was that
it would have been impossible for the UK to act for two reasons:
“One was that I thought the domestic political position was just impossible … the
other … was it seemed to me legally it would be very, very difficult.”176
576.  Asked whether the US had fully embraced the UN route, Sir David replied:
“No, I think the description … is we moved them from scepticism to reluctant
acquiescence. I don’t think there was a sudden conversion.”
577.  In his memoir, Mr Straw expressed concern that the US Administration
interpreted Mr Blair’s position in his discussions with President Bush as offering
the UK’s unconditional support.
578.  Mr Straw told the Inquiry that President Bush’s speech was the critical point at
which the US “committed itself to the strategy which we had been arguing for”, and
“meant that we were embarked on the strategy which, in my judgement could easily
have led to a peaceful resolution of this major dispute and that was fundamental to the
approach of the British Government”.177
579.  In his memoir, Mr Straw wrote:
“… when telling people things they didn’t want to hear, Tony frequently used
ambiguous, elliptical language. I continually worried that Bush heard Tony’s nuanced
phraseology as offering unconditional support. Time and again, on Iraq and the
Middle East especially, Colin told me that this was exactly what he was picking up
174 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.
175 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 50.
176 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 70‑71.
177 Public hearing, 21 January 2010, page 540.
192
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