9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
•
Practical
support for Prime Minister Allawi. Two No.10 staff were to
be
seconded to
provide support with government co-ordination and
logistics
(Mr
Nicholas Cannon, a former Assistant Private Secretary to Mr Blair)
and
communications
(Mr Charles Heatly).
118.
Sir Nigel and
Mr Quarrey recommended that the key message for Mr
Blair’s
conversation
with President Bush should be “this is a decisive period for our
joint
mission in
Iraq” and that the UK and US must:
•
hold firm
on January elections;
•
keep up
pressure for delivery on Iraqiisation and reconstruction;
and
•
“give Allawi
the sort of political advice … he needs to help him win the
election”.
119.
During his
visit, Sir Nigel met Prime Minister Allawi, who expressed concern
about
the
capacity of Iraqi Security Forces, which “needed more help from the
UK”.54
120.
Mr Hilary
Benn, International Development Secretary, told Cabinet on 9
September
that on a
recent visit to Baghdad and Basra he had been able to “feel the
difference”
since the
transfer of sovereignty.55
Sunni
outreach was needed in the South, where the
mood was
one of “persistent victimisation”. Reconstruction activity was
continuing, but
had been
adversely affected by the security situation.
121.
Summing up the
Cabinet discussion, Mr Blair said that the coalition must
send
strong
signals that it would stay in Iraq until the job was done, so that
the Iraqi people
would not
fear abandonment. Those opposing the coalition through terrorism
had
“a clear
strategy to plunge the country into chaos” but:
“It was a
fallacy to see the only alternatives for political control as
brutal dictatorship
or
religious fundamentalism and we needed to be as clear-headed in our
strategic
aims as
were the terrorists in theirs.”
122.
During a video
conference with President Bush on 9 September, Mr Blair
raised
both the
need to accelerate Iraqiisation and for enhanced capacity within
the IIG, without
which “too
much fell on Allawi himself”.56
The
existing timelines for improved security and
services
were “too long” and risked delaying the election.
123.
On 13
September, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Mr Blair a second report
covering
“broader
impressions” from his visit to Iraq.57
Sir Nigel
wrote:
“… I don’t
think there’s anything we have, as it were, forgotten. The basic
policy
elements
are right. But this remains a race against time …”
54
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 9 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Nigel Sheinwald’s meeting
with Allawi, 8 September’.
55
Cabinet
Conclusions, 9 September 2004.
56
Letter
Phillipson to Adams, 9 September 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 9 September.
57
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 13 September 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq:
Some Impressions’.
415