9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
515.
Ambassador
Bremer’s account of his time in Iraq records that, after a meeting
on
6 November
with leaders of the Governing Council, he had “realized that our
seven-step
516.
Mr Richmond
attended a meeting with Ambassador Bremer, Gen Abizaid
and Lt Gen
Sanchez on 7 November to discuss a strategy for engaging with
the
517.
Gen Abizaid
reported that his recent discussions with Sunni leaders in Mosul
had
focused on
“jobs and money” though there was also a need for flexible
application of de-
Ba’athification
to “reassure the average Ba’athist that he had a future in the
new Iraq”.
518.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald visited Iraq from 7 to 9 November.291
He reported to
Mr Blair
on his
return, asking for comments on his recommendations before
Mr Straw was due to
visit
Washington. He described two major problems in the political
arena:
•
the failure
of the GC to “get a grip” and “develop a political profile”;
and
•
continued
CPA civilian weaknesses; strategic communications in
particular
remained a
serious problem.
519.
Sir Nigel
proposed asking the FCO and the MOD to second a proper public
affairs
team to
Iraq – Mr Blair commented “Yes. And get the Iraqi media
sorted.”
520.
On the
security situation Sir Nigel wrote:
“No clear
picture of the enemy exists … The nexus of relations between
ex-regime
supporters,
international terrorist and freelance jihadis is much discussed,
but
with little
hard intelligence. As Jeremy Greenstock puts it, the enemy is
mutating
faster than
our (rapidly evolving) security structures can keep up … There is
no
lack of
intelligence; but it’s not having a decisive impact, and there are
problems of
processing
and co-ordination.”
521.
Sir Nigel
continued:
“We have to
put our faith in a combination of (a) Iraqiisation and (b)
better
intelligence
leading to more pre-emption of attacks. On the first, there is now
an
ambitious
scheme for all parts of the security structure. But ICDC [Iraqi
Civil Defence
Corps]
training will not be complete until the spring; and even then
trainees will need
mentoring
and monitoring … There is a bad need for Iraqi police on the
streets to
deal with
basic crime – this, not terrorism, is the main concern for ordinary
Iraqis.
The situation
will remain very fragile, with continuing
casualties.”
289
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
290
Telegram
258 IraqRep to FCO London, 9 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Sunni Strategy
Meeting with Bremer
and
Abizaid’.
291
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 10 November 2003, ‘Visit to
Iraq’ including
manuscript
comments
Blair.
291