9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
445.
Major General
Jonathan Shaw, who became GOC MND(SE) in mid-January
2007,
told the
Inquiry that he “wasn’t there” when negotiations with JAM1 first
began and that
“they were
started by [officials working closely with the military]”,
adding:
“… I can
tell you from my perspective where it began. It began right back in
January
when I
arrived, the germ of the idea had probably been in my head before I
got
446.
Maj Gen Shaw
told the Inquiry that he had quickly concluded that “trying
to
annihilate
JAM in a kinetic attritional confrontation was a bit futile” and
that the way to
deal with
them was to “kill the irreconcilable and … take the reconcilable on
board”.241
As a
consequence “in January the idea started coming to me that we had
to start looking
for someone
to talk to”.
447.
Maj Gen Shaw
“re‑targeted” assets, by telling them “I want you to look for
people
448.
On 19 January,
Maj Gen Shirreff completed his post‑tour report.243
In it he
argued:
“… I am not
convinced that we have correctly identified the strategic Main
Effort and
resourced
it appropriately to avoid potentially disastrous failure in
Iraq.
“We have no
choice but to achieve mission success in Iraq. This
means
concentrating
resources in pursuit of national interests: clouting, not
dribbling.
As we
hand over, it is encouraging to see that the importance of
committing UKSF
[Special
Forces] to support our efforts in SE Iraq has been recognised.
However,
we have
left it very late and depended on a willing and generous ally to
make good
other
shortfalls. I suspect that if we had concentrated strategic assets
from the start
of TELIC,
the margin between success and failure would not be so narrow as
it
appears
now.
“The same
point applies to the Comprehensive Approach. We have preached
its
virtues in
theory without giving genuine substance to it on the ground …
Compare
the
generosity, agility and flexibility of US CERP [Commanders
Emergency
Response
Program] funding with the parsimony of Whitehall and the lack of
any
unity of
command or purpose.”
449.
Maj Gen
Shirreff concluded his report:
“We can
achieve mission success here [in MND(SE)] however complex
and
intractable
the problems facing us. The key is to understand the narrowness of
the
margin
between success and failure and to take nothing for
granted.”
240
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 19.
241
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 19‑20.
242
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 21. Based on redacted
material.
243
Report
Shirreff, 19 January 2007, ‘Post Operational Report – Operation
TELIC, Part One: General
Officer
Commanding’s Overview’.
83