The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

occupation of Iraq were opposed, in Iraq and in region.” The UK did not “want

a repeat of the 1920s”.

• The UK agreed with the US “objective of a NATO role” but “there is very little

chance of getting a formal … decision at present”.

857.  A three‑page Background Note and an Annex setting out the views of key

governments was also produced.

858.  On the legal position, the Background Note stated:

“There are concerns that a second resolution authorising the use of force is needed

before force may lawfully be employed against Iraq to enforce the WMD obligations

in the UNSCRs. If a draft resolution fails because of a veto (or indeed because it

does not receive nine positive votes), the fact that the veto is judged ‘unreasonable’

is immaterial from a legal point of view.”

859.  In response to a request from Mr Blair, Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle

East and North Africa, provided additional briefing on:

• the humanitarian situation – described as “the one area where US Day After

planning is reasonably advanced”;

• options for a second resolution – work was “in hand” and details were “in briefing

pack”; and

• UN involvement in the aftermath – that was “only likely to make progress if the

US side gets a signal from the President to take it seriously”.280

LORD GOLDSMITH’S MINUTE, 30 JANUARY 2003

860.  Lord Goldsmith wrote to Mr Blair on 30 January to emphasise that his view

remained that resolution 1441 did not authorise the use of military force without

a further determination by the Security Council.

861.  Lord Goldsmith’s minute to Mr Blair of 30 January,281 and the fact that he thought

it necessary to send such a letter despite having been told it was not needed for the

meeting with President Bush, is addressed in Section 5.

MR BLAIR’S NOTE, 30 JANUARY 2003

862.  A Note entitled ‘Countdown’ set out a checklist of issues for Mr Blair’s

discussion with President Bush.

863.  It reflected Mr Blair’s convictions that Saddam Hussein had no intention

of complying with resolution 1441 and the inspectors would report Iraq’s

280  Paper FCO [MED], 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Camp David, 31 January: Iraq’ attached

to Letter Sinclair to Rycroft, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Visit to Camp David, 31 January:

Additional Briefing’.

281  Minute Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq’.

158