8 | The
invasion
673.
Lt Gen Reith
recommended that “cross-governmental support” be sought to
deal
with the
range of outstanding tasks and that:
“… a ‘No.10
Special Unit for the Reconstruction of Iraq’ be established. This
unit
should be
headed by a high calibre, lateral thinking, nationally recognised
individual,
with the
ability to galvanise and draw upon the huge and diverse reserves of
UK
talent,
know-how and finance which exist. As yet these reserves have not
been
brought to
bear and it is beyond the capability of PJHQ to do
so.”
674.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the size of the UK AOR on 22 April.382
CENTCOM
was
expected to respond to a UK request for clarification of the extent
of the UK Phase
IV AOR by
26 April. It was likely to have Basra and Maysan provinces at its
core,
together
with Dhi Qar and Muthanna, an area coincident with an ORHA region.
There
was also “a
possibility that the UK’s success in attracting Coalition partners
would result
in a fifth
province being added”.
675.
Adm Boyce
reiterated the importance of the boundaries of the UK AOR
matching
an ORHA
region, whatever the outcome. He also directed Lieutenant
General
Andrew
Ridgway, Chief of Defence Intelligence, to brief the Chiefs of
Staff on “the key
geopolitical
issues associated with each of the provinces within the potential
UK AOR”.
676.
The DIS report
on the provinces in the UK AOR was produced on 28 April and
is
described
later in this Section.
677.
Gen Jackson
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 23 April that UK
forces
considered
the South to be “secure”. The roulement of UK forces was “likely to
start in
June,
providing difficulties relating to the commitment of troops to deal
with potential fire
fighters’
strikes were overcome”.383
678.
On 24
April, against the background of indications that a number
of
potential
Coalition partners were considering offering military
contributions,
Ministers
endorsed the assumption that the UK AOR would comprise
four
provinces,
subject to the permissiveness of the environment and other
nations’
contributions.
679.
Mr Watkins
informed No.10 on 23 April that there were “Encouraging
signs
of interest
from potential Coalition partners”, including Italy, which had
secured
parliamentary
approval for deployment of a brigade headquarters, one
battalion,
400–500
Carabinieri and a number of specialist
capabilities.384
Taken
together, offers
of
contributions provided a promising basis for a UK-led multilateral
division and might
382
Minutes, 22
April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting,
383
Minutes, 23
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
384
Letter
Watkins to Cannon, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Contributions and
Coalition-building’.
119