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8  |  The invasion
673.  Lt Gen Reith recommended that “cross-governmental support” be sought to deal
with the range of outstanding tasks and that:
“… a ‘No.10 Special Unit for the Reconstruction of Iraq’ be established. This unit
should be headed by a high calibre, lateral thinking, nationally recognised individual,
with the ability to galvanise and draw upon the huge and diverse reserves of UK
talent, know-how and finance which exist. As yet these reserves have not been
brought to bear and it is beyond the capability of PJHQ to do so.”
674.  The Chiefs of Staff discussed the size of the UK AOR on 22 April.382 CENTCOM
was expected to respond to a UK request for clarification of the extent of the UK Phase
IV AOR by 26 April. It was likely to have Basra and Maysan provinces at its core,
together with Dhi Qar and Muthanna, an area coincident with an ORHA region. There
was also “a possibility that the UK’s success in attracting Coalition partners would result
in a fifth province being added”.
675.  Adm Boyce reiterated the importance of the boundaries of the UK AOR matching
an ORHA region, whatever the outcome. He also directed Lieutenant General
Andrew Ridgway, Chief of Defence Intelligence, to brief the Chiefs of Staff on “the key
geopolitical issues associated with each of the provinces within the potential UK AOR”.
676.  The DIS report on the provinces in the UK AOR was produced on 28 April and is
described later in this Section.
677.  Gen Jackson informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 23 April that UK forces
considered the South to be “secure”. The roulement of UK forces was “likely to start in
June, providing difficulties relating to the commitment of troops to deal with potential fire
fighters’ strikes were overcome”.383
678.  On 24 April, against the background of indications that a number of
potential Coalition partners were considering offering military contributions,
Ministers endorsed the assumption that the UK AOR would comprise four
provinces, subject to the permissiveness of the environment and other nations’
contributions.
679.  Mr Watkins informed No.10 on 23 April that there were “Encouraging signs
of interest from potential Coalition partners”, including Italy, which had secured
parliamentary approval for deployment of a brigade headquarters, one battalion,
400–500 Carabinieri and a number of specialist capabilities.384 Taken together, offers
of contributions provided a promising basis for a UK-led multilateral division and might
382  Minutes, 22 April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting,
383  Minutes, 23 April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
384  Letter Watkins to Cannon, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV Contributions and Coalition-building’.
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