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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Introduction
1.  This Section addresses:
the decision to remove some members of the Ba’ath Party from public office
after May 2003, a process known as de‑Ba’athification;
the implementation of that decision; and
the impact it had on Iraq.
2.  This Section does not address:
pre‑invasion analysis of, and planning for, de‑Ba’athification, which is addressed
in Sections 6.4 and 6.5;
the decision to disband the Iraqi Army, which is described in Section 12.1; and
the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which is covered in
Section 9.1.
3.  The Inquiry’s conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can be
read in Section 11.2.
The Ba’ath Party
The Arab Socialist Party or Ba’ath Party was founded in Damascus in 1947 by
Michael Aflaq and Salah al‑Din al‑Bitar.1 Its core objective was the creation of a single,
united Arab State.
Having established itself in Syria, the Ba’ath Party then spread to other Arab countries.
The Iraqi Ba’ath Party was formally established in 1952.
The Ba’ath Party took power in Syria through a coup in 1963, where it was enshrined
in the Constitution as “the leading party of society and state”. The party seized power
in Iraq after a revolution in the same year but was manoeuvred out by the military a few
months later.
The Ba’ath Party returned to power in Iraq in 1968 in a coup led by Ahmad Hasan al‑Bakr,
supported by Saddam Hussein. Ba’ath members and party organisations were imposed
on the Iraqi military shortly after.
Saddam Hussein succeeded President al‑Bakr in 1979, after which point the party was
increasingly dominated by individuals linked to him by family or tribal ties.
An ideological split in 1966 led to the Syrian and Iraqi parties becoming estranged and
bitterly antagonistic toward each other. The Syrian Ba’ath Party maintained a focus on
Arab unity while Iraqi Ba’athists focused on Iraqi nationalism.
1 Paper DIS, 1 February 2002, ‘The Iraq Ba’ath Party – Its History, Ideology and Role in Regime Security’.
2
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