9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
country,
some opportunist, others well planned and co-ordinated
complex
operations,
which have inflicted significant civilian and military casualties.
Evidence
that Former
Regime Elements are increasing their activity in the Sunni
Triangle
and
extending their links to extremist groups in other parts of the
country. Even if
Fallujah
and Najaf are resolved, the potential remains for an upsurge in
violence and
other
spectaculars by extremists intent on undermining Coalition support.
Iraqis will
continue to
feel insecure in the absence of a clear political route
ahead.”516
933.
In his minute,
Maj Gen Stewart concluded:
“The
security situation remains part of the whole. In MND(SE) it is
manageable
at current
effort provided external factors are contained. The leadership of
the
ISF needs
to be improved and supported with the necessary policies to
develop
a credible
national force so that Iraqis can increasingly take charge of their
own
security.
Most importantly, the political process must be addressed by
improving
popular
engagement in it. Iraqis at all levels need to see the benefits
from the bottom
up and have
a say in the top down.”517
934.
The external
factor which Maj Gen Stewart judged to be most threatening
to
security in
the South was “the approach to the al-Sadr problem”,
specifically:
“The Shia
will not accept a forceful solution that either places the holy
sites at risk or
sees
al-Sadr arrested by CF [Coalition Forces]. Such a resolution had
the potential
to inflame
the street, turning dissatisfaction into an
insurgency.”
935.
On 26 April
Mr Rycroft wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary, copying
his letter to
DFID, the
MOD, the Cabinet Office and to UK officials in Iraq and the
US.518
936.
Mr Rycroft
wrote that Mr Blair had read all 15 reports produced as a
result of
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s commission of 19 April, had thought them “very good”
and:
“The
conclusion the Prime Minister draws … is that the problem we face
is not
multi-faceted.
It is simple: security. It casts its shadow over everything from
oil
production
to education to the political process. The Iraqis ultimately want
what we
want:
a stable Iraq from which the Coalition Forces leave. The
essential elements of
our
security strategy have to be: make a reality of Iraqi-isation;
focus on hearts and
minds; and
make clear that we will stay, in overwhelming force, until the job
is done.”
516
Telegram
186 IraqRep to FCO London, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Current Security
by Area’.
517
Minute
Stewart to No.10, 22 April 2004, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Iraq
Letter’.
518
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 26 April 2004, ‘Iraq: 15 Reports for the Prime
Minister’.
359