14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
127.
Despite the
decision in the 1998 SDR to shift the focus towards a capability
for
expeditionary
operations, no concept of operations for PPVs had been identified
in
mid‑2003
and there were no definitive timescales for the provision of
vehicles.
128.
PPVs were not
deployed during the invasion of Iraq and unarmoured Land
Rovers
were
initially used for patrols.
129.
The MOD
Directorate [of] Equipment Capability (Special Projects)
(DEC(SP))
hosted a
PPV workshop on 16 July 2003.60
It was
attended by MOD teams and
stakeholders,
including representatives from Headquarters Land
Forces.
130.
A DEC(SP)
representative “reiterated his belief that the capability gap
was
essentially
three fold:
a. the
enduring NI [Northern Ireland] type requirement;
b. the
emerging wider requirement for light forces engaged on operations
such
as in
the Balkans and in Iraq;
c. the
enduring requirement for protected mobility for specialist users
such as
Royal
Engineers Explosive Ordinance Disposal …”
131.
A range of
procurement options for a capability to meet the requirement
were
set out at
the workshop, including options to extend the life of Snatch by 10
years,
a commercial
off‑the‑shelf purchase or the up‑armouring of an in‑service vehicle
such
as the
Pinzgauer.
132.
It was agreed
at the meeting that a coherent statement of the concept
of
operations,
threat assessment and payload requirement should be provided by the
end
of August.
HQ Land would facilitate a trial of Snatch, and possibly
Tavern, in Iraq.
133.
There was
limited intelligence on the conditions of southern Iraq before
the
invasion
but there were warnings from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
about the
size,
attitudes and capabilities of tribes in the area. That is addressed
in Section 6.2.
134.
A significant
and increasing threat to UK forces in Iraq from Improvised
Explosive
Devices
(IEDs) was emerging as early as July 2003.
60
Minutes, 17
July 2003, ‘Protected Patrol Vehicle Workshop Wednesday 16 July
2003’.
25