The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

145.  Mr Brummell responded to Mr Patey’s letter of 31 January on 2 February, stating

that Lord Williams had “repeatedly underlined the need” to keep the lawfulness of

activities in the NFZs “under review” and had “requested an update of the humanitarian

situation in both the north and the south of Iraq”.83

146.  Mr Brummell pointed out that Lord Williams had “not however received … a

clear and definitive assessment of whether, in the event UK and US operations in the

southern No-Fly Zones were to cease, extreme humanitarian distress would result on a

scale comparable to that which led to grave humanitarian crisis and to the establishment

of the zones in 1991 and 1992”.

147.  Mr Brummell concluded:

“The Attorney is profoundly concerned that, in the absence of a clear and definitive

assessment, he is not in a position to take a view as to the legal arguments

regarding the continuing operations by UK forces in the No-Fly Zones. He stresses

that in these circumstances it is absolutely imperative that he receives at the very

earliest opportunity a clear and definitive view, endorsed at the highest level, as to

the assessment of the humanitarian consequences that will ensue in the event that

such operations cease.”

148.  Mr Sawers showed Mr Brummell’s letter to Mr Blair.84 In an accompanying note

he wrote:

“Jonathan [Powell] mentioned this to you. Gareth [Lord Williams] is demanding

unreasonable assurances, and if he persists will force us to stop enforcing/patrolling

the southern NFZ.

“Geoff [Hoon] will see Gareth on Monday and has asked me or Jonathan to go with

him. I have told him you would be furious if we end up having to stop working with

the Americans, whilst we and they are reviewing policy, and just before your first

meeting with Bush.”

149.  Mr Sawers wrote in manuscript on Mr Brummell’s letter: “Utterly unreasonable

letter.”85 Against Mr Brummell’s reference to a humanitarian crisis comparable to the

scale of 1991 and 1992, Mr Sawers wrote: “Ludicrously high standard.”

150.  Mr Blair replied: “Unbelievable.”86

151.  Officials from the Cabinet Office, the MOD and the FCO made strenuous efforts in

the days immediately following the receipt of Mr Brummell’s letter to agree the terms of

83  Letter Brummell to Patey, 2 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.

84  Note (handwritten) Sawers to Blair, [undated], [untitled].

85  Manuscript comment Sawers on Letter Brummell to Patey, 2 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.

86  Manuscript comment Blair on Note Sawers to Blair, [undated], [untitled].

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