The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
main factor
behind the decline in the local police effectiveness over a similar
period –
more so
than any lack of training or capability.
517.
Mr Browne’s
Assistant Private Secretary commented that these views
seemed
in
contradiction to the messages that had previously been received on
the success
of Op SINBAD.
There was “a lack of firm indicators to substantiate or refute”
the
different conclusions.
518.
In her weekly
report Dr Marsden said she had advised Mr Browne:
“… that the
political significance of Basra Palace should also be factored into
military
planning.
As the location of the British Consulate and the US Embassy
Office,
Basra Palace
was seen as the symbol of our continuing commitment to
stabilising
Basra.
Withdrawing from purely military bases … could credibly be
presented
as
something we were doing at the request of the Government of Iraq
and at a
time
of their and our choosing. The optics of leaving Basra Palace
were different.
However we
dressed it up, we risked handing a propaganda victory to JAM and
their
519.
On 31 January,
Mr Blair met Lt Gen Houghton and senior officials from the
FCO
and
SIS.274
In his
briefing note for the discussion Mr Blair’s Private Secretary
wrote:
“Initial
reports suggest that Des is not making much headway with the
American
military in
Iraq, partly because they (and, frankly, we) have never seen a
worked up
plan as to
what our troops would be doing post‑re‑posturing, and how they
would
ensure e.g.
mentoring, situational awareness, ability to re‑intervene. We have
been
asking MOD
for detail on this for some time.”275
520.
In their
meeting, Mr Blair stressed to Lt Gen Houghton that it would be
necessary
to get
“absolute clarity on the position in Basra before taking a firm
decision on, and
announcing,
a redeployment”.276
521.
Lt Gen
Houghton commented that it would be important to explain to the US
that
the UK was
not proposing to abandon bases in Basra, rather they would transfer
to Iraqi
control,
with UK training teams embedded within them. The approach to
mentoring in
Basra was
different from that being developed by the US for other areas of
Iraq, in part
because the
context was different.
522.
Mr Blair
remained concerned about Iraqi ability to ensure security after
re‑posturing
and then
PIC. He asked whether the UK’s plans would ensure that
militias could not
act with
impunity. Lt Gen Houghton noted that the UK would retain a
re‑intervention
capability,
but accepted that there was risk involved.
273
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 1 February 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
274
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 31 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Officials’.
275
Minute
Banner to Blair, 30 January 2007, ‘Iraq Meeting, 31
January’.
276
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 31 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Officials’.
98