The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
for
everyone. He wanted to get the thing done quickly, but he also
wanted them
to understand
better the broader agenda. He felt Bush had moved a good
deal
on that
but was less convinced it permeated through the rest of the
Administration.”
819.
When Lord
Goldsmith met No.10 officials on 27 February he advised
that
the safest
legal course would be to secure a further Security Council
resolution.
820.
Lord
Goldsmith told them, however, that he had reached the view
that
a “reasonable
case” could be made that resolution 1441 was capable of
reviving
the
authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990) without a
further resolution,
if there
were strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq had failed to
take
the final
opportunity offered by resolution 1441.
821.
Lord
Goldsmith advised that, to avoid undermining the case for
reliance
on resolution
1441, it would be important to avoid giving any impression that
the
UK believed
a second resolution was legally required.
822.
At the request
of No.10, Lord Goldsmith met Mr Powell, Baroness
Morgan
(Mr Blair’s
Director of Political and Government Relations) and Sir David
Manning
on 27 February.251
The
discussion, and Mr Powell’s request that Lord Goldsmith’s
advice
should not
“become public”, are addressed in Section 5.
823.
Informal
consultations in the Security Council on 27 February showed
there
was little
support for the UK/US/Spanish draft resolution.
824.
The Security
Council held “informal consultations” on the UK/US/Spanish
proposal
825.
Mr Miller
provided a brief for Sir Jeremy Greenstock to use in the
Council
discussion,
setting out the UK assessment of Iraq’s WMD and its response to
resolution
1441.253
That is
addressed in Section 4.3.
826.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported:
•
Ambassador
Negroponte had said he “hoped for a decision on the
resolution
in the not
too distant future”; and that it “asked only if Iraq had complied
with
its final
opportunity”. “The Council should judge the facts on the basis of
what
had
happened over the last 108 days.” He would be “concerned” about
the
251
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 26 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting at
No.10, 27 February’.
252
Telegram
318 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 27
February Consultations
and
Missiles’.
253
Letter
Miller to Greenstock, 26 February 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD
Brief’.
326