The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
£5m to fund
UK military Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to help generate
stability
within
communities; and
•
£10m for
DFID’s own rapid response capacity.
“Under many
scenarios, £35m is unlikely to be perceived as an adequate
UK
contribution
to any immediate relief effort, particularly if OFF collapses.
Leaving
£25m for
further humanitarian need, medium-term rehabilitation and
reconstruction
could also
look very sparse. Action in response to the Secretary of State’s
previous
two letters
[Ms Short’s letters of 5 and 14 February] to the Prime Minister on
this
rests with
No.10.
“If the
military is involved in the direct delivery of humanitarian
assistance, there will
be an issue
about who pays. MOD claim to be financially stretched and are keen
for
DFID to pay
…”
471.
Ms Short held
a meeting to discuss those recommendations on 18
February,
attended by
Dr Brewer, Ms Miller, Mr Fernie and other DFID
officials.208
Mr Chakrabarti
was not
present, but was sent a copy of the record.
472.
Ms Short
stated that she was unwilling, without a clear financial package,
to plan
to do more
than “support the UN, key international agencies, and perhaps
provide some
financial
assistance to the UK military for Quick Impact Projects”. She had
repeatedly
made it
clear in various forums (to Mr Blair in person and in writing,
and in the House
of Commons)
that DFID did not have the financial resources to play a major
role.
473.
Within those
constraints, Ms Short was content for officials:
•
to start
discussions about possible support to NGOs not yet involved in Iraq
that
had
specific technical expertise in areas such as water and
sanitation;
•
to work
closely with the US on a humanitarian response, but only if there
was an
overarching
UN mandate and financial cover; and
•
“in
principle”, to make money available to the UK military for QIPs, to
be
re‑examined
if there was no UN mandate and the UK military was
“working
under a US
lead”.
474.
Ms Short did
not agree to a forward base in Kuwait on the grounds that it
would
imply that
military action was a certainty. DFID could make scoping visits to
the region
and arrange
for vehicles to be ready for transportation, but the equipment
should not
be
pre-positioned in the region. Ms Short “accepted that this would
mean that DFID
would not
be prepared for an immediate response in the event of military
action or a
humanitarian
crisis on the ground”. She suggested that DFID consider providing
more
208
Minute
Bewes to Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, 19 February
2003, ‘Iraq Contingency
Planning:
Update’.
392