The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Key
revisions in the text tabled in the Security Council by the US and
UK on 23 October
were:
•
a new
OP2
recalling that
the Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would
face
serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
objectives,
replacing
the reference to all necessary means in the initial
OP10;
•
a new
OP4
deciding that
false statements and omissions in the declarations
submitted
by Iraq (pursuant to this resolution ‑ the original OP2
provisions)
and failure
by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co‑operate fully in
the
implementation
of this resolution shall constitute a further material
breach
of Iraq’s obligations;
•
a new
OP11,
a revision of
the previous OP9, directing Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei
to report
immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with
inspection
activities,
as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament
obligations,
including
its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
and
•
a new
OP12,
a revision of
the previous OP10, deciding that the Council would
convene
immediately upon receipt of a report (in accordance with OP11)
to
consider
the situation and the need for full compliance with all the
relevant
Security
Council resolutions in order to restore international peace and
security.
702.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that he had stated:
“In terms
of process this was the first time we … had a text worth putting
down
as [the]
basis for discussion. The text gave Iraq a clear warning that it
had a last
chance to
comply with strengthened UN inspections. This was a genuine offer
…
the
co‑sponsors were proposing two clear stages. No decisions on
further action
would be
taken until inspections had been tested by UNMOVIC/IAEA,
professional
and
independent bodies. If [they] reported problems, the text made
clear that the
Council
would immediately meet to discuss the way forward – this was
something
the UK had
wanted and which had not figured in previous drafts. The rest of
the draft
dealt with
two main priorities: strengthening inspections so Iraq understood
it had
no escape
but to comply; and underlining the serious consequences if Iraq did
not
comply,
subject to OPs 11 and 12.”240
703.
Sir Jeremy
added that he “hoped this was something the whole Council
could
support”.
704.
Sir Jeremy
reported that while the French delegation had welcomed the
progress
since the
initial draft to identify two, well‑defined stages, there were
still concerns that
it
contained “hidden triggers” for automatic military action. France
also wanted the
240
Telegram
2030 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK/US
Text Presented to the
Security
Council’.
324