The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
928.
The Iraq
Strategy Group considered the IPU paper on 2
September.877
The lack
of
progress on
the police and a gap in funding for the Iraqi Armed Forces were
highlighted.
Mr James
Tansley took over as Consul General in Basra in September and sent
a
telegram to
FCO colleagues with his first impressions on 31
October.878
He
described
Basra as “a
city whose social, political and economic structures had largely
decayed”.
The
political scene had been “dominated by rivalry between Sadrists and
Baristas” and
differences
between the two groups had grown in the last two years, flaring up
into “open
confrontation”.
Mr Tansley
wrote that the city was “a less liberal place than it was a year
ago, with gangs
enforcing
clampdowns on the sale of DVDs, musical instruments, alcohol,
women’s attire
and
behaviour and gambling through intimidation. Both Sunnis and
Christians ha[d] been
targeted by
Shia extremists.”
On crime,
Mr Tansley wrote:
“The Iraqi
Police do not compile crime statistics. But over the summer, our
police
advisers
have recorded an average of 65 murders a month in the
province.
Kidnapping
and extortion are rife. Basra has long been known for smuggling
and
prostitution
… [and] in recent years, the province has become an
increasingly
important
conduit for illegal drugs from Afghanistan via Iran.
“But the
serious money today comes from oil smuggling … estimates from
both
the US
IRMO [Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office] and MND(SE)
suggest
that
possibly as much as 30 percent of the South’s oil production is
appropriated
illegally
…
“Corruption
may be endemic throughout Iraq. But in Basra, where the
opportunities
for illicit
gain are greater, the stakes are higher … Links between crime and
politics
abound. No
prominent politician seems untainted, and all the main players have
their
own
militias with links to the various law enforcement agencies
…
“Compared
to Central and Northern Iraq, the number of coalition casualties
in
Basra has
been low. But the threat of kidnapping and EFP IED [Explosively
Formed
Projective
Improvised Explosive Device] attacks by anti‑coalition groups
remains
high, and
disrupts both our and MND(SE)’s work. In addition, the levels of
criminal,
political
and sectarian violence are high and rising. This lawlessness
overshadows
all life
in Basra, and acts as a major obstacle to development
…
“The police
(IPS) are currently unable to address Basra’s security problems.
Minimal
screening
of entrants to the IPS after the fall of Saddam [Hussein], poor
leadership
and the
connections between politicians and crime in Basra have resulted in
a force
riven with
factions, many of whom are as likely to be involved in criminal
activity as
helping to
prevent it …”
877
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 6 September 2005,
‘Iraq Strategy Group’.
878
Telegram
16985/05 Basra to FCO London, 31 October 2005, ‘Basra: First
Impressions’.
266