3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
•
The US and
UK “might also have to make clear that only a serious
violation
would
trigger further Council action”.102
304.
The FCO
provided a paper on the options, including:
•
variants on
the language for a “new OP10”;
•
how these
variants were likely to be viewed by France and
Russia;
•
whether
Kosovo provided a precedent; and
•
the
principles on which a possible side agreement might be
based.103
305.
Mr Straw
recommended that Mr Blair should discuss the case for moving
to one of
those
options, with President Bush, “to achieve the goal of a much
tougher inspections
regime, and
putting the onus on the Security Council to pass the necessary
second
resolution
in the case of non‑compliance or do huge damage to the credibility
of the UN
system”.
Mr Blair should start with an option whereby the Security
Council declared its
readiness,
in the event of non‑compliance, to decide whether there had “been a
further
material
breach of Iraq’s obligations” and “that such a breach” authorised
“member
states (or
another formula …) to use all necessary means to restore
international peace
and
security”.
306.
The FCO did
not address the precedent of Kosovo for Iraq. The paper stated
only
that:
“Several
Council resolutions on Kosovo warned of an impending
humanitarian
catastrophe,
and affirmed that the deterioration in the situation constituted a
threat
to peace
and security in the region. But we argued that military action was
justified
as an
exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophe,
rather than
that it was based on any provisions in a resolution.”
307.
The FCO
suggested that a possible side agreement between the parties on
the
adoption of
a second resolution should be based on the following general
principles:
“… where
there is information/evidence [reported by UNMOVIC/IAEA] of any
Iraqi:
•
action/attempts
to conceal information related to weapons programmes;
•
action/attempts
to conceal other information which UNMOVIC/IAEA deem
necessary
to fulfil their mandate;
•
action/attempts
to obstruct the work of UNMOVIC/IAEA personnel in a
manner
likely to
impede UNMOVIC/IAEA’s effectiveness in fulfilling their
mandate;
•
failure to
co‑operate in the establishment of OMV [ongoing
monitoring
and verification],
or in the destruction of any equipment designated by
102
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UNSC Resolution’
attaching Paper, ‘Options
for a New
OP10’.
103
Paper
‘Options for a New OP10’, attached to Letter McDonald to Manning, 2
October 2002,
‘Iraq: UNSC Resolution’.
255