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3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
The US and UK “might also have to make clear that only a serious violation
would trigger further Council action”.102
304.  The FCO provided a paper on the options, including:
variants on the language for a “new OP10”;
how these variants were likely to be viewed by France and Russia;
whether Kosovo provided a precedent; and
the principles on which a possible side agreement might be based.103
305.  Mr Straw recommended that Mr Blair should discuss the case for moving to one of
those options, with President Bush, “to achieve the goal of a much tougher inspections
regime, and putting the onus on the Security Council to pass the necessary second
resolution in the case of non‑compliance or do huge damage to the credibility of the UN
system”. Mr Blair should start with an option whereby the Security Council declared its
readiness, in the event of non‑compliance, to decide whether there had “been a further
material breach of Iraq’s obligations” and “that such a breach” authorised “member
states (or another formula …) to use all necessary means to restore international peace
and security”.
306.  The FCO did not address the precedent of Kosovo for Iraq. The paper stated only
that:
“Several Council resolutions on Kosovo warned of an impending humanitarian
catastrophe, and affirmed that the deterioration in the situation constituted a threat
to peace and security in the region. But we argued that military action was justified
as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe,
rather than that it was based on any provisions in a resolution.”
307.  The FCO suggested that a possible side agreement between the parties on the
adoption of a second resolution should be based on the following general principles:
“… where there is information/evidence [reported by UNMOVIC/IAEA] of any Iraqi:
action/attempts to conceal information related to weapons programmes;
action/attempts to conceal other information which UNMOVIC/IAEA deem
necessary to fulfil their mandate;
action/attempts to obstruct the work of UNMOVIC/IAEA personnel in a manner
likely to impede UNMOVIC/IAEA’s effectiveness in fulfilling their mandate;
failure to co‑operate in the establishment of OMV [ongoing monitoring
and verification], or in the destruction of any equipment designated by
102 Letter McDonald to Manning, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UNSC Resolution’ attaching Paper, ‘Options
for a New OP10’.
103 Paper ‘Options for a New OP10’, attached to Letter McDonald to Manning, 2 October 2002,
‘Iraq: UNSC Resolution’.
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