9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
962.
Mr Day
considered it too early to say how the UK ought to respond
politically and
strategically
to new circumstances in Basra:
“At best,
we could find the city stabilises and improves, which could ease a
decision
on our
longer term commitment. At worst, we could find ourselves
confronted
with very
difficult choices about how to respond to renewed violence, and a
much
more
complicated background to our long term strategic direction.
Initial analysis
suggests
that options might include our retaining control of MND(SE), with
the
expectation
that this would require us to deploy extra resources to meet the
new
US plans;
negotiating with the US to define a role in their plan that we
could meet
within
existing resources, either retaining command of MND(SE) or
operating
under
a US 2*; and using the changed circumstances as the
catalyst for ending our
mission in
Basra.”
963.
Lt Gen Cooper
reported to ACM Stirrup on 6 April that Basra had been
“relatively
calm” in
the week following the cease-fire.477
From
Baghdad to Basra an “awkward
faceoff
seems to have developed, with the Government having to balance its
(legitimate)
determination
to continue operations in support of the Rule of Law with the
threat of the
Sadrists to
break their Freeze again”. Lt Gen Cooper described Prime Minister
Maliki
as “in
control and emboldened” and outlined positive moves by the Iraqi
Government to
kick-start
the economy in Basra “driven by a welcome recognition of the
economic basis
of
criminality and militia-membership”.
964.
Lt Gen Cooper
reported having discussed Basra with Gen Petraeus and
concluded:
“I am confident that the driver behind the current reinforcement of
MND(SE)
is a
theatre-specific desire to exploit an opportunity. He also
confirmed that he had
no
intention of asking the UK to reinforce in Basra”. But Lt Gen
Cooper believed that
Gen Petraeus’
rejection of proposals to change the boundaries of MND(SE)
was
calculated
to “tie in a UK two star officer to Southern Iraq for the
foreseeable future”.
965.
Lt Gen Cooper
continued:
“We have to
be honest about US perceptions. They see Basra as they found
it
as
ungoverned space. They are determined that it will not revert.
While Petraeus
has told me
that he sees no requirement for the UK to reinforce MND(SE), he
also
believes
the MNF-I build up was the right thing to do. He was pleased with
the
results of
action against JAM there … as he has made clear, he believes
economic
progress is
fundamental to underpinning the security line of operation. If the
UK
will not
leverage Iraqi money to deliver rapid progress, the US will use
their own
expertise,
links to Baghdad and manpower.
“The US
view Southern Iraq through the prism of Iran. Events of the past
week in
Basra and
Baghdad have reinforced perceptions … It also explains why, sooner
or
later,
MNF-I will move into Maysan in order to control better the Iranian
border. Any
477
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 6 April 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (295) 6 Apr
08’.
361