The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses the UK planning for a military invasion of Iraq and
the
decisions:
•
on 31
October 2002 to offer ground forces to the US for planning purposes
for
operations
in northern Iraq; and
•
in December
to deploy an amphibious force, including 3 Commando
Brigade.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
The
decision in mid‑January 2003 to deploy a divisional headquarters
and three
combat
brigades for potential operations in southern Iraq and the
commitment
of those
forces to a combat role in the initial stages of the invasion of
Iraq.
That is
addressed in Section 6.2. That Section also sets out the principles
of
international
humanitarian law (IHL) governing the conduct of military
operations,
including
control of targeting decisions.
•
The
campaign plan for the invasion which is addressed in Section
8.
•
The roles
and responsibilities of the Defence Secretary, the Chief of
the
Defence
Staff (CDS), the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), and other
key
military
officers and civilians, and the way in which advice was prepared
for
Ministers
and decisions taken in the MOD in 2002 and 2003. They are set out
in
Section 2.
•
The
decisions on the wider UK strategy and options in relation to Iraq
which are
necessary
to understand the wider context surrounding military
deployments.
Those are
addressed in Section 3.
•
The UK’s
assessments of Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and
ballistic
missile
programmes and its intentions to retain and conceal its weapons of
mass
destruction
(WMD) capabilities. They are addressed in Section 4.
•
The
consideration of the legal basis for military action, which is
addressed in
Section
5.
•
The
preparations to equip the force for operations in Iraq, and the
implications of
the
decisions between mid‑December 2002 and mid‑January 2003 to
increase
the size of
UK combat forces and be ready to take an earlier role in the
invasion
in support
of US forces. They are addressed in Section 6.3.
•
The funding
for the operation, which is addressed in Section 13.
•
The
planning and preparations for the UK military contribution
post‑conflict,
including
decisions on the UK’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) for UK
military
forces.
They are addressed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5.
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