3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
191.
Sir David
and Dr Rice also discussed the positions of France and Russia
and
indications
that their stance might have shifted in response to a calculation
that “one way
or another,
the game was up for Saddam”.
192.
Sir David
reported that he had told Dr Rice that, if President Bush was
“willing to
continue
down the UN route, he would have the international community pretty
much
behind him.
As long as there were UN cover, very few of the key countries
seemed
likely to
break ranks.” The unanimous support for resolution 1441, President
Bush’s
victory in
the US mid‑term elections and his performance in Prague had
“changed the
terms
of trade”.
193.
Sir David
told Mr Blair that Dr Rice had asked if he would be
willing to talk to
President
Bush. There were some people in Washington who would want to argue
for
military
action as soon as the Iraqi declaration was available. President
Bush would
be under a
lot of pressure from those who wanted him to discount the
international
dimension.
194.
Sir David
told Dr Rice he was sure Mr Blair would welcome a
discussion. He added
that, in
his view, the UN process had been a triumph for President Bush. “If
he were
patient, he
would now be able to take an international coalition with him all
the way.
This would
have benefits for US policy across the board.” That would not
be
incompatible
with a strategy “to audit the gap”, particularly if “support or
acquiescence”
from France
and Russia had been secured.
195.
Sir David
commented that Dr Rice had been “clearly signalling that
[President]
Bush would
probably be willing to continue working within UN parameters,
taking the
international
community with him, if you [Mr Blair] made the case”. He
concluded:
“… this
offers us a valuable opening to influence President Bush at a
key
moment.
I suggest you speak to him … when we have had another day to
digest
developments
post Prague.”
196.
Mr Blair
told President Bush on 26 November that he thought the
inspectors
probably
would find something, and that would be the trigger for military
action.
197.
Mr Blair
telephoned President Bush on 26 November to discuss the outcome of
the
Prague
Summit, Mr Blair’s discussion with Dr Blix and the
response to Iraq’s declaration,
and how to
make progress on the Middle East Peace Process.62
198.
In the
discussion on Iraq, Mr Blair stated that if Iraq did not
provide a full
declaration,
Dr Blix should produce his own audit. Mr Blair “accepted
that the first time
the
inspectors found anything significant that was not in the
declaration would constitute
a material
breach”. He thought that the inspectors probably would find
something and
that this
would be the trigger for military action.
62
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 26 November 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush,
26 November’.
37