15.1 | Civilian
personnel
•
all FCO
UK‑based staff worked six weeks on with 10 days off;
•
FCO staff
served no more than 12 months in Iraq, with the option to
extend
in exceptional
circumstances;
•
high staff
turnover and decompression breaks were a major
challenge;
•
it remained
difficult to attract new staff, especially at lower grades, despite
the
incentives
(high allowances and decompression breaks); and
•
FCO staff
who did take up postings found it rewarding and almost all the
current
complement
had extended or would extend beyond their initial six
months.
457.
Sir Peter
Ricketts chaired a meeting with FCO, DFID and MOD officials
on
1 September
to review security at UK posts in Iraq.303
He informed
Mrs Beckett that the
meeting had
seen no need to change Sir Michael Jay’s four conditions for
any FCO
member of
staff serving in Iraq.
458.
Sir Peter
reported that there had been a roadside attack on an Embassy
convoy
in Baghdad
on 31 August and a similar attack on a DFID convoy in Nasiriyah
on
1
September. One CRG employee had been badly injured in the Nasiriyah
attack. Other
examples of
the evolving threat and risks included increased indirect fire
attacks on the
compounds
in Baghdad and Basra. As risks increased, security measures evolved
to
mitigate
them, but Sir Peter had concerns about two
issues:
•
Pressure to
accommodate increasing numbers of officials and/or military
staff
with space
in Baghdad and Basra at a premium. Sir Peter had asked
officials to
consider
whether any functions, particularly on the management side, could
be
outsourced
or relocated.
•
The
vulnerability of the Basra Palace site. The helicopter air bridge
was mission
critical.
Because of wider problems with MOD helicopter availability, the
FCO
had had to
start the procurement process for a dedicated helicopter service
paid
for by the
FCO.
459.
Later in
September, Mr Asquith, who had replaced Mr Patey as
British Ambassador
to Iraq,
advised Sir Peter Ricketts that the two attacks on UK convoys
demonstrated the
effectiveness
of the UK’s risk management measures.304
The number
of staff at post was
evaluated
continually to ensure they were able to contribute to post
objectives.
460.
Mr Asquith
reported that space on the compound in Baghdad was at a
premium,
but the
Embassy had not reached crisis point. He saw little scope for more
outsourcing.
Greater use
of LE staff was the obvious option, but it was difficult to find
Iraqi staff willing
to work in
the International Zone and, with no robust way of vetting new
staff, there were
questions
of trust and security.
303
Minute
Ricketts to Foreign Secretary, 1 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Security of
Posts’.
304
Letter
Asquith to Ricketts, 20 September 2006, ‘Iraq: Security of our
Embassy in Baghdad’.
325