The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“terrifying
possibility that his poisons and diseases” would “find their way
into the hands
of Al Qaida
and its sympathisers” could not be ruled out.
297.
Sir Richard
Dearlove told No.10 that UK intelligence had been responsible
for
two of
UNMOVIC’s finds.
298.
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA’s inspections were supported by information provided
by
299.
The FCO
advised No.10 in mid-January that UK intelligence had helped
UNMOVIC
to discover
illegally imported rocket engines.117
300.
The UK also
had provided intelligence on the home of the Iraqi scientist who
had
concealed
documents relating to Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear
programme.118
301.
At Sir Richard
Dearlove’s request, his Private Secretary sent an update on
the
progress of
inspections to Sir David Manning on 12 February.119
302.
Sir David was
told that the strike rate in relation to the UK
intelligence-led
inspections
was low, but it had been responsible for two out of three UNMOVIC
finds
to date,
from more than 550 inspections. In addition, “even where there is
no WMD,
something
else has often been concealed […] Our inspections have revealed
the
Iraqi game.”
303.
Sir Richard’s
update also stated that “we needed to keep going in the
expectation
that an
intelligence-led inspection would lead to a find or a solid refusal
of entry”.
304.
Sir David sent
the letter to Mr Powell with the comment: “More inspections
ahead –
but time
getting very short.”120
305.
In a note
produced on 12 February, the DIS recorded that most of the site
visits
conducted
by UNMOVIC and the IAEA during the first six weeks were “intended
[to]
familiarise
inspectors with the sites, and inspection
techniques”.121
306.
From early
January, “the inspections had become longer and more intrusive”
and,
by the
beginning of February, UNMOVIC had “visited or inspected all but
one of the UK’s
116
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 136.
117
Letter
Davies to Rycroft, 15 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Hans Blix, UNMOVIC’.
118
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 136.
119
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 12 February 2003, ‘Update on Intelligence-Led UNMOVIC
Inspections’.
120
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell [undated] on Letter PS/C to Manning, 12
February 2003,
‘Update on
Intelligence-Led UNMOVIC Inspections’.
121
Note DIS
Counter Proliferation Support Group, 12 February 2003, ‘The
Effectiveness of UN Weapons
Inspections
in Iraq’.
348