The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the inspectors
had been unable to account for some of the ballistic missiles
and
chemical
and biological weapons and material produced by Iraq; and that it
had:
•
not totally
destroyed all its stockpile of chemical and biological
weapons;
•
retained up
to 360 tonnes of chemical agents and precursor chemicals
and
growth
media which would allow it to produce more chemical and
biological
agents;
•
hidden a
small number of long‑range Al Hussein ballistic missiles;
and
•
retained
the knowledge, documentation and personnel which would allow it
to
reconstitute
its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile
programmes.
502.
The JIC also
judged that, since the departure of the weapons inspectors,
Iraq:
•
was
actively pursuing programmes to extend the range of its
existing
short‑range
ballistic missiles beyond the permitted range of
150km;
•
had begun
development of a ballistic missile with a range greater than
1,000km;
•
was capable
of resuming undetected production of “significant quantities”
of
chemical
and biological agents, and in the case of VX (a nerve agent)
might
have
already done so; and
•
was
pursuing activities that could be linked to a nuclear
programme.
503.
Iraq’s
chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes were seen as
a threat
to
international peace and security in the Middle East region, but
Iraq was viewed as
a less
serious proliferation threat than other key countries of concern –
Iran, Libya and
North Korea
– which had current nuclear programmes. Iraq’s nuclear facilities
had been
dismantled
by the weapons inspectors. The JIC judged that Iraq would be unable
to
obtain a
nuclear weapon while sanctions remained effective.
504.
The JIC
continued to judge that co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida
was
“unlikely”,
and that there was no “credible evidence of Iraqi transfers of
WMD‑related
technology
and expertise to terrorist groups”.
505.
In
mid‑February 2002, in preparation for Mr Blair’s planned
meeting with President
Bush in
early April 2002, No.10 commissioned the preparation of a paper to
inform the
public
about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and WMD more generally
in four key
countries
of concern, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Iraq.
506.
When the
preparation of this document became public knowledge, it was
perceived
to be
intended to underpin a decision on military action against Iraq.
The content and
timing
became a sensitive issue.
507.
Reflecting the
UK position that action was needed to disarm Iraq, Mr Blair
and
Mr Straw
began, from late February 2002, publicly to argue that Iraq was a
threat which
had to be
dealt with; that Iraq needed to disarm or be disarmed in accordance
with the
70