6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
1228.
Mr Dodds
sent advice on the Straw/Hoon joint minute to Mr Brown
on
1229.
Mr Dodds
reported that the picture looked “rather different to that
presented in
the correspondence”:
“The
Defence Chiefs say that a ‘medium size’ deployment (ie
10,000-15,000) is the
most we
could sustain in the medium term without lasting damage to our
forces.
MOD
officials tell us they had intended the submission [the joint
minute] to pose the
question
‘do you want us to do as much as we can (ie this medium size
deployment)
or as
little as we can get away with (ie less)?’ The question is not
posed in that form
and hence
is not answered. The choice
is essentially political, but it is essential
to note
that the cost of a deployment on this medium scale is about
£1bn
a year.”
1230.
Mr Dodds
reported that the concept of sectors in US military planning
had
moved on:
“The plan
now appears to have four ‘two-star commands (ie divisions)’ outside
of
Baghdad,
focusing more flexibly on the tasks that need to be done, rather
than being
tied down
to specific narrow locations.
“The MOD
ambition is to have a UK-led ‘two-star command’.
However:
•
the scale
of military effort needed will depend on the permissiveness of
the
environment
… and the relationship between the military and civil
powers;
•
it is
unlikely, except in the most benign scenario, that the
maximum
envisaged
size of UK force would be able to deal with all the challenges
…
on its
own;
•
without an
appropriate UN resolution to legitimise the aftermath,
MOD
believe it
unlikely that any significant Coalition partners will come forward
to
share our
burden …”
1231.
Mr Dodds
commented that, in that context, Mr Blair’s questions of 21
March about
the size of
the UK sector, the duration of the UK commitment and the exit
strategy were
“excellent
questions”, but could not be answered easily. More relevant
was:
“… how to
ensure a permissive environment as quickly as possible, and how
to
maximise
the number of militarily-capable Coalition partners to share our
burden.
“And given
past experience, while going all out for a suitable resolution, it
would be
wise to ask
what our Plan B would be if we couldn’t get one. MOD currently
don’t
have an
answer to that!”
525
Minute
Dodds to Chancellor, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution
to Post-Conflict Iraq’.
529