The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
353.
Mr Straw
sent an Iraq Oil and Gas Strategy to Mr Blair on 12
July.203
The
strategy,
which had
been developed by FCO, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
DFID
officials
over the previous month, defined three UK objectives:
•
“The
development of an efficient, outward-looking and transparent oil
and
gas
industry, capable of delivering sustainable export revenues to meet
the
development
needs of the people of Iraq and meeting domestic needs
for
energy in
an efficient, equitable and secure manner.
•
Increasing
involvement of the private sector, leading to sustained
investment
over the
next five to 10 years and substantial business for UK companies
…
•
To promote
Iraq’s role in international oil and gas markets and as a
constructive
influence
within OPEC.”
354.
Mr Quarrey
marked the strategy to Sir Nigel Sheinwald with the comment: “I do
not
intend to
put in the box! Looks OK.” 204
Sir Nigel
agreed.205
355.
The UK
revisited the strategy in March 2006, and retained those
objectives.206
356.
The strategy
and the UK’s engagement on oil and gas issues are considered
in
Section
10.3.
357.
Deputy Prime
Minister Salih launched the ITG’s National Development
Strategy
(NDS) at
the fourth meeting of the IRFFI Donor Committee in Amman on 18
and
19 July.207
The IIG had
launched an earlier national strategy in Tokyo in
2004.
358.
In his
introductory remarks, Mr Salih said that the high level of
unemployment in
Iraq was
fuelling economic despair and insecurity. The reconstruction effort
had focused
on
large-scale, capital-intensive infrastructure projects. Those
“mega-projects”, though
appropriate
and essential, had not succeeded in providing Iraq’s basic needs
quickly
enough. The
answer was to complement them with “community-level” projects
that
demonstrably
changed people’s lives for the better.
359.
Mr Salih
highlighted the shortfall in funding for electricity supply. The
October
2003 World
Bank/UN Joint Needs Assessment had estimated that US$20bn would
be
required to
restore power to 1990 levels. Less than half that amount had been
allocated.
Production
averaged around 5,000MW against a demand of 20,000MW.
203
Letter
Straw to Blair, 12 July 2005, ‘ Iraq: Oil and Gas Strategy’
attaching Paper FCO/DTI/DFID,
[undated],
‘Iraq: Oil and Gas Strategy’.
204
Manuscript
comment Quarrey to Sheinwald, 13 July 2005, on Letter Straw to
Blair, 12 July 2005,
‘Iraq: Oil
and Gas strategy’.
205
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald to Quarrey on Letter Straw to Blair, 12 July
2005, ‘Iraq: Oil and Gas
Strategy’.
206
Paper
IPU/FCO, 28 February 2006, ‘UK Objectives for Iraq’s Oil and Gas
Sector’.
207
International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, 18 July 2005,
Speech by H
E Barham Salih Minister
of Planning
and Development Cooperation to the International Reconstruction
Fund Facility Committee
Meeting,
Dead Sea, Jordan,18-19 July 2005.
256