13.1 | Resources

last two years, the FCO has entered three claims on the Reserve in respect of

the events in Afghanistan and Iraq – none of which were predictable within the

Spending Review cycle. The total FCO claims for these reserves were £105 million.

The Treasury did not dispute the unforeseeable and emergency nature of these

costs and yet the Reserve met only £54.5 million …

“… I have consistently rejected knee‑jerk claims from officials that they need more

resources when in fact they have done insufficient to reprioritise. But the FCO

budget is now substantially overstretched … The Government needs to decide what

priority it places on delivery of the Government’s overseas agenda – including the

direct costs to the Exchequer if we fail.”347

578. When Mr Boateng’s decision was discussed in the Iraq Senior Officials Group on

20 October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock commented that it would be difficult for him to return

to the CPA without any UK funding, and that more generally “the absence of financial

flexibility was making our work harder in Baghdad”.348

579. Mr Boateng and Mr Straw discussed the bid after Cabinet on 23 October.349

580. The Treasury briefing for Mr Boateng rehearsed the reasons why the bid had been

rejected, dismissed any suggestion that bids from the FCO were treated differently from

those of other departments, and argued that the FCO had chosen not to reprioritise

adequately to match the increasing demands of Iraq:

“At the end of last financial year and earlier this year, decisions could have

been taken within the FCO to reallocate greater contingency funding to match

this government priority [Iraq]. This never happened.

“Other departments, such as DFID, have shown themselves to be more flexible

in re‑prioritising to assist with the Iraq effort. FCO should be able to match

this.”350

581. After the meeting, Mr Boateng informed Treasury officials that he had received

an assurance from Mr Straw that he would not pursue the bid further, and that they had

agreed officials should continue to work to identify ways of funding media proposals from

within existing resources.351

347 Letter Straw to Boateng, 20 October 2003, ‘Iraq Reserve Claim: Reconstructing the Media Network’.

348 Minute Dodd to Sheinwald, 20 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials Group’.

349 Email Treasury [junior official] to Treasury [junior official], 23 October 2003, ‘FCO £15m Iraq Media

Strategy: Speaking Note/Draft Letter from CST to Jack Straw’.

350 Briefing Treasury, 22 October 2003, ‘Reserve Claim: Iraq Media Strategy: Speaking Note: CST to

Jack Straw’.

351 Email Treasury [junior official] to Treasury [junior official], 23 October 2003, ‘FCO £15m Iraq Media

Strategy: Speaking Note/Draft Letter from CST to Jack Straw’.

539