14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
431.
The FCO Senior
Overseas Security Adviser visited Kirkuk, Baghdad and
Basra
between 10
and 21 November.225
He
reported:
“The
Security Managers and CRG [Control Risks Group] are to be
congratulated
on their
professional control of road movement … It is clear that all road
moves
are subject
to risk … The use of helicopters is vital in order to change the
pattern
of movements.
“We
recommend that all staff in Basra can move in Warrior armoured
vehicles.”
432.
Dr Reid
visited Basra in early December.226
The report of
his visit stated that he
had had “an
opportunity to examine vehicles fitted with upgraded armour
kits”.
433.
On 7 December,
AM Torpy briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the discovery of a
large
EFP
suggested that rogue JAM elements “had intended to attack heavily
armoured
Coalition
vehicles, including Warrior”.227
434.
In his
‘Hauldown Report’ to AM Torpy of 12 December,
Maj Gen Dutton wrote:
“… the
dominant feature of the last four months of my … tour has been the
victim
initiated
passive infrared explosively formed projectile. This weapon, which
has
now
proliferated through Iraq has radically affected our freedom of
manoeuvre
and
consequently inhibited our Security Sector Reform and CIMIC effort.
There is
a straight
trade‑off here: if troops are doing force protection, they cannot
be doing
SSR. We are
taking direct action against perpetrators … constantly amending
our
TTPs and
there is a huge scientific effort to produce counter measures. We
will
never
entirely defeat this threat, but it is manageable and I do not
believe it has
a significantly
deleterious effect on morale in this AO [Area of
Operations].”228
435.
On 16
December, officials from the Department for International
Development
(DFID)
recommended to Mr Hilary Benn, the International Development
Secretary,
a number
of changes to transport arrangements in Basra, including the use of
Warrior
vehicles by
DFID staff for mission critical visits to certain sites in southern
Iraq.229
Until
then, DFID
staff had travelled in civilian rather than military vehicles
because of their
lower
profile, consistent with the nature of DFID’s work.
436.
Officials
advised Mr Benn:
“… the
continuing threat from EFPs in southern Iraq fundamentally
compromises our
ability to
complete important projects, particularly in the power and water
sectors at
acceptable
levels of risk.”
225
Minute FCO
[junior official] to Patey, 1 December 2005, ‘Security Visit to
Baghdad and Basra’.
226
Minute
Beadle to CJO, 7 December 2005, ‘The Secretary of State’s visit to
Basrah – 2 December 2005’.
227
Minutes, 7
December 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
228
Letter
Dutton to Torpy, 12 December 2005, ‘June to December 2005 –
Hauldown Report’.
229
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 16 December
2005, ‘Iraq: Iraq Security
Update’.
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