Previous page | Contents | Next page
14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
431.  The FCO Senior Overseas Security Adviser visited Kirkuk, Baghdad and Basra
between 10 and 21 November.225 He reported:
“The Security Managers and CRG [Control Risks Group] are to be congratulated
on their professional control of road movement … It is clear that all road moves
are subject to risk … The use of helicopters is vital in order to change the pattern
of movements.
“We recommend that all staff in Basra can move in Warrior armoured vehicles.”
432.  Dr Reid visited Basra in early December.226 The report of his visit stated that he
had had “an opportunity to examine vehicles fitted with upgraded armour kits”.
433.  On 7 December, AM Torpy briefed the Chiefs of Staff that the discovery of a large
EFP suggested that rogue JAM elements “had intended to attack heavily armoured
Coalition vehicles, including Warrior”.227
434.  In his ‘Hauldown Report’ to AM Torpy of 12 December, Maj Gen Dutton wrote:
“… the dominant feature of the last four months of my … tour has been the victim
initiated passive infrared explosively formed projectile. This weapon, which has
now proliferated through Iraq has radically affected our freedom of manoeuvre
and consequently inhibited our Security Sector Reform and CIMIC effort. There is
a straight trade‑off here: if troops are doing force protection, they cannot be doing
SSR. We are taking direct action against perpetrators … constantly amending our
TTPs and there is a huge scientific effort to produce counter measures. We will
never entirely defeat this threat, but it is manageable and I do not believe it has
a significantly deleterious effect on morale in this AO [Area of Operations].”228
435.  On 16 December, officials from the Department for International Development
(DFID) recommended to Mr Hilary Benn, the International Development Secretary,
a number of changes to transport arrangements in Basra, including the use of Warrior
vehicles by DFID staff for mission critical visits to certain sites in southern Iraq.229 Until
then, DFID staff had travelled in civilian rather than military vehicles because of their
lower profile, consistent with the nature of DFID’s work.
436.  Officials advised Mr Benn:
“… the continuing threat from EFPs in southern Iraq fundamentally compromises our
ability to complete important projects, particularly in the power and water sectors at
acceptable levels of risk.”
225  Minute FCO [junior official] to Patey, 1 December 2005, ‘Security Visit to Baghdad and Basra’.
226  Minute Beadle to CJO, 7 December 2005, ‘The Secretary of State’s visit to Basrah – 2 December 2005’.
227  Minutes, 7 December 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
228  Letter Dutton to Torpy, 12 December 2005, ‘June to December 2005 – Hauldown Report’.
229  Minute DFID [junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 16 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Iraq Security
Update’.
73
Previous page | Contents | Next page