The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Muqtada
al-Sadr was descended from a long line of distinguished Shia
clerics known
for their
political activism.205
His father,
Grand Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr, was jailed under
Saddam
Hussein’s regime and assassinated in 1999.
Muqtada
inherited from his father a network of quasi-political offices in
Baghdad and
across the
south of Iraq called “Offices of the Martyr Sadr” (OMS) which were
used to
spread the
Sadrist message and provide social welfare.
After the
bombing of the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf by Al Qaida in August 2003,
Muqtada
al-Sadr
established an armed militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) or the Mahdi
Army, to protect
Shia
religious establishments, counter the Badr Corps and resist the
Occupation of Iraq.
345.
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry that concern about the problem of
Sunni
marginalisation
was growing through August and September 2003.206
The problem
had
been
“relatively easily diagnosed”: the Sunnis had gone from having a
very dominant
role in all
aspects of the Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein to having a very
different
future in a
democratic state in which they made up approximately 20 percent of
the
population.
The disbandment of the army and the de-Ba’athification process had
also
had a huge
effect on employment in the Sunni provinces of Iraq.
346.
A message from
Baghdad on 4 September confirmed that Ambassador
Bremer
had no
problem with the issues to be discussed with President
Bush.207
He was
reported
to be
requesting between US$20bn and US$22bn in additional funding to pay
for
investment
in infrastructure as well as the daily running of
Iraq.
347.
The eight
pieces of advice Mr Blair had requested were submitted the
same day.208
348.
The IPU’s
paper on security said that:
“Attacks on
Coalition Forces, the UN and Iraqis working with the Coalition
are
undermining
confidence and holding back efforts to restore basic services.
The
cumulative
effect is to undermine the consent of the Iraqi people to the
presence of
Coalition
Forces and raise the risk of strategic failure.”209
349.
The papers on
security and essential services had been discussed by the
AHMGIR
earlier in
the day. On security, Mr Straw as Chair had commissioned
further work, in
particular
on addressing Iraq’s “porous borders”.210
205
JIC
Assessment, 12 July 2007, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr: Keeping His
Distance’.
206
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 52-57.
207
Telegram
150 IraqRep to FCO London, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for
Prime Minister’.
208
Letter
Adams to Cannon, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for the Prime
Minister’.
209
Letter
Adams to Cannon, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for the Prime
Minister’ attaching Paper IPU,
4 September
2003, ‘Iraq: security’.
210
Minutes, 4
September 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
266