3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
210.
In relation to
other states which might have amassed stockpiles of weapons
of
mass
destruction and could proliferate those weapons, Mr Straw
stated:
“It is our
hard‑headed judgement that we can best prevent the use of their
weaponry
through
diplomacy.
“With
Saddam Hussein, the diplomatic route has been constantly and
consistently
obstructed
by his intransigence and duplicity. It has been blocked altogether
since
December
1998 leaving us no alternative but to consider other options. Iraq
not the
UN has
chosen the path of confrontation.”
211.
Mr Straw
added that Iraq had:
“… much
greater intent to use … [weapons of mass destruction] Saddam’s is
the
only regime
in recent history to have used chemical weapons, the only regime
to
have been
declared in breach of the Geneva protocol on chemical weapons
and
the only
regime that sees those weapons of mass destruction as an active
tool of
regional
and internal dominance. As page 19 of the dossier sets out, Saddam
is
prepared to
use these weapons – they are by no means a last
resort.”
212.
Asked why he
was convinced that Saddam Hussein would use weapons of
mass
destruction,
except as a suicidal gesture in response to a military invasion
when he was
desperate
and beaten, Mr Straw replied that there was “no need to look
in the crystal
ball for
the reason why”. The answer was in Saddam’s record: “He has done it
once,
he has
done it twice; he can easily do it again.”
213.
Addressing the
question of whether it would be justifiable to use force to deal
with
the threat
from Iraq, Mr Straw stated:
“The short
answer … is yes, provided force is a last resort and its use is
consistent
with
international law.
“Law …
depends for its legitimacy on the values it reflects … But … there
will always
be some who
reject or despise the values on which the law is based. Against
them,
the law has
to be enforced, ultimately by the force of arms. But the force used
has
to be
consistent with the moral and legal framework it seeks to
defend.”
“The UN
declaration of human rights and the UN Charter … recognised that …
the
ultimate
enforcement of the rule of international law had to be by force of
arms.
…
“Diplomacy
… should always be tried first, but the paradox of some situations
–
Iraq is
pre‑eminently one – is that diplomacy has a chance of success only
if it
is combined
with the clearest possible prospect that force of arms will be
used
237