1.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001

and frontline states would be reluctant to agree an intrusive regime. Moreover as

general trade increased, there would be a growing risk that military components

and WMD dual-use items would be smuggled to Iraq.”

243.  The arms embargo remained “largely intact”. Some dual use goods had “slipped

through the net”. The introduction of a more widely accepted sanctions regime would

enhance the prospects of the arms embargo holding.

244.  If Saddam Hussein judged that he could no longer deflect blame for Iraq’s

humanitarian plight or maintain his sources of income, he might be forced to reassess

his policy of non-co-operation with resolution 1284. The JIC judged that “the effect of

smart sanctions is likely to fall short of this”. There were indications that Russia, France

and China would feel obliged to welcome the concept of smarter sanctions, but would

take account of Iraqi pressure and other political factors. Rebuilding P5 consensus

would be difficult; but a resolution passed with P5 unanimity would significantly increase

pressure on Iraq, and help rebuild UK public support for the UK’s policy.

245.  Saddam Hussein was “more likely for now to use renewed discussions at the UN

as a means to delay both progress on UNSCR 1284 and the introduction of smarter

sanctions. If Saddam were forced to consider re-admitting UN weapons inspectors, he

would still seek to weaken the inspections provisions, an agreed timetable for the lifting

of sanctions and abolition of the NFZs.”

246.  Mr Ricketts wrote to Mr Sawers on 9 March, identifying the “main implications for

policy” of the analysis:

“• … the arms embargo remains crucial. It has stopped Saddam getting new

major weapons systems. We judge that state suppliers will continue to deny Iraq

such systems whilst Saddam remains in power … There is some leaking of

dual use items and spare parts. This would probably grow if all civil trade

was freed up …;

• … ending sanctions on civil trade would give us and the US an opportunity to

change perceptions in the Arab world and beyond on humanitarian issues …;

• … bringing the revenues from oil smuggling back under UN control would

have the biggest impact on the cash reaching Saddam’s pocket …;

• … on inspection of border crossings, we judged that neighbouring states

would be likely to agree in principle, although getting them to implement them

effectively will be much more difficult; and

• … the neighbours would want guarantees of compensation for income they lost

as a result of their co-operation on smuggling/border trade.”134

134  Minute Ricketts to Sawers, 9 March 2001, ‘Iraq: Impact of Smarter Sanctions’.

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