8 | The
invasion
•
There are
significant numbers of troops still in the city (… estimated
over
3,000) as
well as tanks … armoured forces are being destroyed as the
regime
counter‑attacks
into the al-Faw Peninsula. The military has attempted
to
reinforce;
however, 16 Air Assault Brigade have destroyed an armoured
column
(estimated
as 17 T-55s …) moving into the city from the north.
•
[…]
desertion rates within Basra are assessed to be high. Some members
of
the RA
[Regular Army] have attacked Ba’ath officials […] UK forces have
been
approached
by a member of the RA who stated that elements of the RA
will
conduct
attacks on regime forces once the Coalition moves to take the
city.
Local
population
•
There is a
body of evidence that there may have been an attempted uprising
on
25 March.
This was put down by the regime, with local tribal leaders
summarily
executed.
Civilians are now too frightened to move against [the] regime.
There
are
multiple reports stating that regime forces have also used mortars
and
automatic
weapons to attack civilians trying to leave the city.
•
… as
families leave, elements of the male population seem to be more
confident
to
challenge the regime. As Coalition attacks … are increasingly
successful,
anti‑regime
sentiments are getting stronger.
•
There are
difficulties with supporting anti-regime forces … the Coalition
will not
be able to
differentiate between resistance fighters and regime security
forces.
•
Food and
water is in short supply … UK efforts to assist outside Basra
are
appreciated,
although there have been chaotic scenes.
UK
operations within Basra
•
[…]
•
UK armoured
forces have entered the city at night … There are
strong
indications
that this aggressive posture by UK forces is undermining
the
confidence
of regime figures …”
354.
Mr Scarlett
also provided separate and detailed advice for Sir David Manning
on
Iraq’s
irregular forces.191
355.
The points
made by Mr Scarlett included:
•
The
intelligence was “often unclear or unreliable” about which
organisation was
involved in
particular events, and the “distinction between these
organisations”
might break
down “particularly in confused situations eg currently in
Basra,
Nasiriyah
and Najaf”.
•
Before the
conflict, each of Iraq’s 18 Governorates had had “one
Fedayeen
battalion
and one or two ‘emergency forces’ battalions … of Ba’ath Party
militia
and
intelligence/security forces (with each battalion up to 1,500
men)”.
191
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 2 April 2003, ‘Iraqi Irregular
Forces’.
59