The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
individuals
with the right skills and appropriate levels of seniority, and to
provide
leadership
by appointing a UK Head of CPA(South):
•
On 3 June,
Mr Blair called for Whitehall to return to a “war
footing”.7
There
needed to
be “a strong civilian team in the South. In general, there needed
to be
a much
stronger civilian grip”.
•
On 2 July,
Baroness Amos, the International Development
Secretary,
recommended
the deployment of additional staff with the right skills
and
seniority.
•
On 10 July,
Ministers agreed that the UK effort in the South should be
increased
and that a
UK figure should be made Head of CPA(South).
•
On 28
August, the AHMGIR agreed, “subject to security concerns”,
that
Sir Hilary
Synnott, Head of CPA(South), should be given “such assistance
and
staff as he
deemed necessary”.8
36.
Departments
did not rise to the challenge:
•
Sir Hilary
Synnott told the Inquiry that, on his arrival in Basra on 30
July:
“The phones
didn’t work ... and nobody had thought to provide me with any
form
•
On 5
September, Mr Neil Crompton, Head of the Iraq Policy Unit (IPU),
reported
that the
view in Iraq was that the job there was “doable”, but the UK
needed
to “throw
massive resources at the problem now”.10
CPA(South)
was “woefully
under-staffed”.
It was clear that the UK would have to fill the positions
itself
rather than
rely on third-country nationals or CPA Baghdad.
•
On 23
September, Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Deputy
Special
Representative
on Iraq, reported that UK “influence in CPA Baghdad is
limited;
we supply
only 100 out of its 1,000 staff there”.11
•
Sir Hilary
Synnott told the Inquiry: “One of my key requests was at the end
of
August when
I asked for, I think, 37 additional expert staff ... By 1
January,
18 out
of 37 had arrived.”12
37.
Departments’
weak response to the instruction to strengthen the UK
civilian
presence in
Iraq represented a missed opportunity to alleviate some of the
problems
created by
the failures of pre-invasion planning and preparation.
38.
It is not
possible to assert that the rapid deployment of all the additional
personnel
requested
would have materially altered the situation in Iraq. It is,
however, the Inquiry’s
7
Minute
Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 3
June’.
8
Minutes, 28
August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
9
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 9.
10
Minute
Crompton to Chaplin, 5 September 2003, ‘Visit to Iraq: 31 August to
3 September’.
11 Minute
[junior official Cabinet Office] to Sheinwald, 25 September 2003,
‘Iraq Senior Officials Group
Meeting’.
12
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 45.
416