The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
459.
Before his
visit to Washington, Mr Scarlett provided Sir David with a list of
points
where more
information was needed about Iraq and its intentions, for his “back
pocket”,
including:
“•
Iraq’s CBW
and ballistic missile capability …
•
Saddam’s
‘red lines’ which would provoke him to use CBW against
coalition
forces or
his neighbours.
•
What Saddam
plans to do if there is a credible military force being prepared
…
Does he
[Saddam] consider pre-emption a possibility?
•
Will he fully
accept inspectors if the US threat seems imminent? If he
does
accept
(likely …), how open is he willing to be?
•
The
cohesion of key military and security organisations … At what point
will they
desert/stop
doing their duty?
•
Who might
act against Saddam and would they act before Baghdad is
occupied
by
coalition forces?
•
The
prospects for an uprising of the civil populace in Shia cities and
what the
[Iraqi]
security forces’ response would be.
•
The likely
popular attitude to a US invasion and the arrival of US or allied
troops
on their
territory.
•
What would
be the Israeli response to an Iraqi CBW attack?”179
460.
Sir David
Manning had a “pre-meeting” with Mr Armitage.180
461.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the meeting stated that Sir David and Mr Armitage
discussed
the US and
UK positions.181
462.
The US focus
was on the disarmament of Iraq, not the re-admittance of
inspectors.
Sir David
had raised questions about Saddam Hussein’s capabilities and
intentions and
the
importance of the UN route with an ultimatum for political and
“optical” reasons,
not just
legal reasons, to change the international context. It would have
to be a tough
ultimatum
with a short timeframe and no wriggle-room which shifted the onus
onto
Saddam
Hussein.
463.
Sir David told
the Inquiry that he had raised a number of detailed points
with
Mr Armitage:
“… Why now?
What if Saddam Hussein were to use weapons of mass
destruction
during a
military campaign? What would follow military action? What role …
would
179
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 26 July 2002, ‘Iraq: We do not know enough
about …’.
180
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 16.
181
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Armitage’.
80