6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
Baroness
Morgan (Director of Political and Government Relations),
Mr Campbell and
Sir David
Manning, on 23 July.188
438.
The discussion
in the meeting and the actions that followed are addressed
in
Section
3.3.
439.
In relation to
military planning, the record of the meeting produced by
Mr Matthew
Rycroft,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
stated:
•
Mr Scarlett
summarised the intelligence and latest (4 July) JIC
Assessment:
“Saddam’s
regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way
to
overthrow
it was likely to be by massive military action.” Saddam was
“worried
and
expected an attack”, but he was “not convinced” that an attack
would be
“immediate
or overwhelming”.
•
Sir Richard
Dearlove reported that there was “a perceptible shift in
attitude”
in
Washington: “Military action was now seen as inevitable.” President
Bush
“wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction
of
terrorism and WMD”.
•
Adm Boyce
reported that Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush would
be
briefed by
CENTCOM planners in early August. The US was examining
two
military
options, and saw the “UK (and Kuwait) as essential”. The three
main
options for
UK involvement were:
“(i) Basing
in Diego Garcia and Cyprus plus […] SF [Special
Forces]
squadrons.
(ii) As
above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As
above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000 perhaps with a
discrete
role in
northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.”
•
Mr Hoon
said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put
pressure
on the
regime. In his view, January was the most likely timing for
military action.
•
Mr Straw
stated that it “seemed clear” that President Bush had “made up
his
mind to
take military action, even if the timing was not yet
decided”.
•
Lord
Goldsmith warned that the desire for regime change was not a legal
basis
for
military action. Self‑defence and humanitarian intervention could
not be the
basis for
military action in this case.
•
Mr Blair
had stated: “The two key issues were whether the military plan
worked
and whether
we had the political strategy to give the military plan the
space
to work.”
•
Adm Boyce
did not yet know if the US battleplan was “workable”. There
were
“lots of
questions”, for example “the consequences if Saddam Hussein
used
WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting
began”.
188
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
241