The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
218.
On 24 May, the
MOD Strategic Planning Group (SPG), headed by
Brigadier
James
Dutton and reporting to Lt Gen Pigott, produced a paper for the
Chiefs of Staff
on
potential UK military commitments.123
‘Contingency
Thinking: Force Generation and
Deployment
for the Gulf’ (see Section 6.1) was circulated to a limited number
of named
MOD
addressees. It aimed to provide sufficient information “to judge
what the UK’s
maximum
level of commitment could be in the event of a contingent operation
against
Iraq,
together with appropriate costs and timings”.
219.
On the
post-conflict phase, the paper stated that it might be necessary to
maintain
force
elements in theatre for policing, stabilisation or humanitarian
operations, which had
the
potential to add considerably to the cost and commitments,
depending on the end
state of
the campaign.
220.
The emerging
findings from the SPG analysis were presented to Mr Hoon
on
24 May
to report to Mr Blair in advance of a planned meeting with
Secretary Rumsfeld
221.
Mr Hoon sent
Mr Blair an update on military contingency planning for Iraq
on
31 May
(see Section 6.1).125
222.
Mr Hoon’s
minute was copied to Mr Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the
Exchequer),
Mr Straw
and Sir Richard Wilson (Cabinet Secretary). The minute included a
definition of
the end
state, which it described as “tentative objectives to guide”
contingency planning.
The
definition, agreed with Mr Straw, envisaged:
“A stable
and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with
the
international
community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or
international
security,
abiding by its international obligations on WMD.”
“In order
for us to plan properly we need to know what outcome in Iraq the
US
would wish
to achieve … and when the US might wish to take action. It would
also
be useful
to know how long the US see themselves as remaining engaged in
Iraq.
Further, we
need to clarify the policy basis and legal justification for any
action.”
224.
Mr William
Nye, Head of the Treasury Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence
Team,
provided a
commentary for Mr Brown on 7 June.126
He pointed
out that the MOD had
only
provided costings for preparing for an operation, not for deploying
a force, for a
campaign,
or for any “follow-up operation”. He commented:
“MOD have
understandably given no thought to costs ‘after the war’ … But
there
must at
least be the possibility of some medium-term deployment for
peacekeeping
or
occupation. If on the scale of the Balkans, it would cost several
£100m a year.”
123
Paper SPG,
24 May 2002, ‘Contingency Thinking: Force Generation and deployment
for the Gulf’.
124
Minute
DCDS(C) to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 May 2002,
‘Iraq’.
125
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
126
Minute Nye
to Chancellor, 7 June 2002, ‘Iraq: potential costs’.
150