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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
218.  On 24 May, the MOD Strategic Planning Group (SPG), headed by Brigadier
James Dutton and reporting to Lt Gen Pigott, produced a paper for the Chiefs of Staff
on potential UK military commitments.123 ‘Contingency Thinking: Force Generation and
Deployment for the Gulf’ (see Section 6.1) was circulated to a limited number of named
MOD addressees. It aimed to provide sufficient information “to judge what the UK’s
maximum level of commitment could be in the event of a contingent operation against
Iraq, together with appropriate costs and timings”.
219.  On the post-conflict phase, the paper stated that it might be necessary to maintain
force elements in theatre for policing, stabilisation or humanitarian operations, which had
the potential to add considerably to the cost and commitments, depending on the end
state of the campaign.
220.  The emerging findings from the SPG analysis were presented to Mr Hoon on
24 May to report to Mr Blair in advance of a planned meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld
in early June.124
221.  Mr Hoon sent Mr Blair an update on military contingency planning for Iraq on
31 May (see Section 6.1).125
222.  Mr Hoon’s minute was copied to Mr Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer),
Mr Straw and Sir Richard Wilson (Cabinet Secretary). The minute included a definition of
the end state, which it described as “tentative objectives to guide” contingency planning.
The definition, agreed with Mr Straw, envisaged:
“A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with the
international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or international
security, abiding by its international obligations on WMD.”
223.  Mr Hoon advised:
“In order for us to plan properly we need to know what outcome in Iraq the US
would wish to achieve … and when the US might wish to take action. It would also
be useful to know how long the US see themselves as remaining engaged in Iraq.
Further, we need to clarify the policy basis and legal justification for any action.”
224.  Mr William Nye, Head of the Treasury Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team,
provided a commentary for Mr Brown on 7 June.126 He pointed out that the MOD had
only provided costings for preparing for an operation, not for deploying a force, for a
campaign, or for any “follow-up operation”. He commented:
“MOD have understandably given no thought to costs ‘after the war’ … But there
must at least be the possibility of some medium-term deployment for peacekeeping
or occupation. If on the scale of the Balkans, it would cost several £100m a year.”
123  Paper SPG, 24 May 2002, ‘Contingency Thinking: Force Generation and deployment for the Gulf’.
124  Minute DCDS(C) to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
125  Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
126  Minute Nye to Chancellor, 7 June 2002, ‘Iraq: potential costs’.
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